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THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF
"GOING PRIVATE" AND OTHER CHANGES
OF CORPORATE CONTROL
THOMAS A. PutAiNo, JR.*
Abstract: Public shareholders likely have suffered billions of dollars in
losses in recent years as a result of collusion among potential purchasers
in change-of-control transactions. Unfortunately, the federal courts have
been unable to devise an appropriate antitrust approach to collusion in
change-of-control transactions. This article proposes a new approach to
the antitrust regulation of the market for the control of public and pri-
vate companies. Collusion among purchasers in that market has occurred
in nearly every American industry The proposed approach will effectively
deter the three types of anticompetitive conduct most likely to occur in
these circumstances: (1) express agreements to allocate bids among po-
tential purchasers, (2) implicit bid rigging by potential purchasers, and
(3) consortiums among potential purchasers to submit single bids in
company auctions. This Article illustrates the advantages of the proposed
approach by applying it to "going private" transactions, which in recent
years have become the most popular—and the most controversial—of all
types of acquisitions.
INTRODUCTION
A. Collusion in Change-of-Control Transactions
The potential for collusion in corporate change-of-control transac-
tions poses one of the greatest antitrust challenges of our time. During
the last few years, shareholders likely have suffered billions of dollars in
losses as a result of agreements among potential purchasers to limit bid-
ding for the purchase of control of American companies.' Collusion
among purchasers has occurred in the market for control of both public
and private entities and has involved companies in nearly every Ameri-
* Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, Parker Hannifin Corporation,
Cleveland, Ohio; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1974; B.A., Allegheny College, 1971; Distin-
guished Adjunct Lecturer, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The opinions
expressed in this Article are personal to the author and do not reflect the opinions of
Parker Hannifin Corporation.
I See infra notes 96-123 and accompanying text.
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can industry. 2
 Such bid rigging would constitute a "per se" violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act if it occurred for any other commodity. 3 The
federal courts, however, have deprived shareholders of an effective anti-
trust remedy against collusion in change-of-control transactions. 4
The federal courts need to develop a new antitrust approach that
will allow shareholders to recover losses incurred as a result of collusion
in change-of-control transactions. This Article proposes an approach
that will effectively deter the three types of anticompetitive conduct
that are most likely to occur in such circumstances: (1) express agree-
ments to allocate bids among potential purchasers, (2) implicit "bid
rigging" by potential purchasers, and (3) consortiums among potential
purchasers to submit single bids in company auctions. 5
B. Going-Private Transactions
This Article illustrates the advantages of the proposed approach by
applying it to "going-private" transactions, which, in recent years, have
become the most popular and the most controversial of all types of ac-
quisitions. 8 In such transactions, private equity firms buy out the public
shareholders, operate the company as a private entity for a short period
(usually three to five years), 7 and then "flip" it for a quick profit to a
competitor in the same industry, to another private equity firm, or to
the public in an initial public offering ("IPO"). 8 In 2006 and 2007,
2 Sec infra notes 15-17, 59-70, 112-123 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 228-233 and accompanying text.
Sec infra notes 143-156, 262-265, 280-282 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 228-296 and accompanying text.
6 As the Delaware Court of Chancery stated in 2007 in In re The Topps Co. S'holders
Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 963 (Del. Ch. 2007), "Few contexts are more important to stockhold-
ers than the pendency of a transaction in which they exchange their shares for cash and
the company is taken private."
7 See Orit Gadiesh & Hugh MacArthur, Growing the "Private" Club, WALL ST. J., May 25,
2007, at A14 ("[P1rivate-equity firms invest with a thesis for improving performance in a
realistic, but aggressive time frame—three-to-five years."). Some private equity firms have
an even shorter time horizon, taking companies private and then reselling them to the
public within a year. Hertz, for example, was bought and resold in a twelve month period.
See Michael J. de la Merced, An I.P.O. Glut Just Waiting to Happen, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007,
§ 3, at 6.
A See Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender, Big Buyout Firm Prepares to Sell Stake to Public,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17-18, 2007, at Al ("Private-equity firms buy either companies or divi-
sions of companies on behalf of their own investors, take them private, and then sell them
off within a few years."); Geoffrey Colvin & Ram Charan, Private Lives, FORTUNE, NOV. 27,
2006, at 190 ("Private-equity firms want to buy companies for their portfolio, fix them,
grow them, and sell them in three to five years. The eventual buyer could be another corn-
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commentators, politicians, and antitrust regulators voiced their suspi-
cions that private equity firms were colluding to artificially reduce the
prices they pay for companies in going-private transactions.°
The structure of the private equity market facilitates collusion in
going-private transactions. Only a few private equity firms have the fi-
nancial capacity to bid for the largest going-private transactions. 10 Mar-
kets such as private equity, in which only a small number of firms com-
pete, are called oligopolies, and antitrust regulators examine them
more closely because it is easier for competitors in such markets to en-
gage in collusion." Because of the small number of potential purchas-
ers and their extended history of competing against one another, it is
relatively easy for private equity buyers to allocate bids in change-of-
control transactions without entering into an express agreement. By
sending subtle signals to each other about their competitive intentions,
such buyers can establish a pattern in which they take turns bidding for
companies, thus reducing the purchase price each firm has to pay in a
particular transaction. Such conduct reduces competition just as effec-
tively as if the private equity buyers had entered into an express bid-
rigging arrangement."
Private equity firms can make substantial short-term profits when
they are able to buy public companies at a favorable price." For exam-
ple, in 2002, three private equity firms purchased Houghton Mifflin
from \Tivendi for $1.7 billion." In 2006, the firms "sold the company
again, more than tripling their investment in a few short years."" A se-
ries of such profitable transactions has allowed private equity firms to
achieve a 13% average annual return during the last decade." In 2006
alone, the annual return for all private equity funds was 25%, com-
pany in the portfolio company's industry, another private-equity firm, or the public,
through an IPO.").
9 See infra notes 92-95,112-123 and accompanying text.
10 See Ken MacFadyen, Here Came the Ambulance Chasers: The DOD Inquiry into Private Eq-
uity Has Ignited Its 1st Class Action Lawsuit, INVESTMENT READERS' DEALERS' Dices-r, Nov.
27,2006, available at 2006 WLNR 2050743522265974.
II Thomas A. l'iraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN.
L. REv. 9, 9 (2004) ("In an oligopoly, a small number of sellers controls most of the sales in
the relevant market.").
12 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, One Word Nobody Dares Speak, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, § 3,
at 6.
13 See Dennis K. Berman, The Game: Will Private Equity Suffer a Pushback?, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 2, 2007, at Cl.
11 Id.
19 Id.
its
	 Chancellor, Private Equity: Hit or Miss, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3-4,2007, at 1314.
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pared to only 14% for the publicly traded companies listed on the
Standard & Poor's 500 index. 17 The owners of private equity funds have
acquired enormous wealth by taking companies private at below-
market prices and reselling them to the public shortly thereafter. la
Stephen Schwarzman, the co-founder of the Blackstone Group ("Black-
stone"), the largest private equity firm, and Henry Kravis, the co-
founder of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. ("KKR"), the second-largest
private equity firm, have each become "a poster child of the private eq-
uity world." 19 By 2007, Mr. Schwarzman had accumulated an estimated
$10 billion from going-private transactions. 26
There is now "a growing resentment of the buyout business,"21
fueled by the recognition that private equity firms are "buying public
companies on the cheap so they can sell them later at a hefty profit." 22
The Wall Street Journal's mergers and acquisitions journalist, Dennis K.
Berman, has explained that "shareholders are beginning to see the
money they're leaving on the table." 23 The New York Times has pointed
out that "shareholders often feel that they are getting too low a pre-
mium when they see the private equity firms double their money
seemingly overnight."24 The Wall Street Journal has described share-
holders' and regulators' conclusion that private equity firms "may be
extracting too much value from publicly traded firms, leaving stock-
holders and customers in the lurch."25 Jack LaPorte, the President of
the T. Rowe Price New Horizons fund, argues that "we really feel that
some of our best companies are being stolen out from under us. We
17 Lynn A. Stout, Democracy by Proxy, WALL. Sr. J., Mar. 8, 2007, at A16.
113 Set Berman & Sender, supra note 8.
19 Id.
2° Henny Sender, Blackstone Plan Could Reshape Private Equity, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19,
2007, at Al. Mr. Schwarzman's 60th birthday party in March 2007, which featured singer
Rod Stewart and was emceed by actor Martin Short, was the talk of New York society.
Henny Sender & Monica Langley, Buyout Mogul: How Blackstone's Chief Became $7 Billion
Man, WALL Si. J., June 13, 2007, at Al.
21
 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Of Private Equity, Politics and Income Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2007, § 3, at 7.
22 Berman, supra note 15.
23 Id.
24 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Colluding or Not, Private Equity Firms Are Shaken, N.Y. Thus, Oct.
22, 2006, § 3, at 4; see also Shefali Anand, Legg Mason Manager Thinks U.S. Stocks Are Inexpen-
sive, WALL Si'. J., Jan. 12, 2007, at Cl (stating concern of mutual fund manager that "pri-
vate equity groups are buying public companies at prices that are too low, short-changing
existing investors").
23
 Henny Sender, Dennis K. Berman & Rebecca Smith, Buyout Firms Seek Utility TXU for
$32 Billion, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 24-25, 2007, at Al.
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have decided that enough is enough and we need to stand up for the
rights of our shareholders. "26
Business history in the United States has been characterized by
periods of excess, followed by periods of regulatory reform designed to
redress such excesses. The anticompetitive conduct of the steel, oil, and
railroad monopolies formed in the "Gilded Age" of the late nineteenth
century caused Congress to enact the first federal antitrust law, the
Sherman Act, in 1890. 27 Some commentators, eyeing the enormous
fortunes being made in private equity, have named the first decade of
the twenty-first century the "New Gilded Age" and have called for new
federal laws to regulate such transactions. 28 Commenting on the posi-
tion of private equity firms facing increased regulation, Steven Miller, a
managing director at Standard & Poor's Leveraged Commentary and
Data, has stated that "Mt feels like Tony Soprano, sitting in the ice-
cream parlor with all this trouble brewing around him, and wondering
where the bullet might come from.'"29
C. Potential Remedies for Collusion in Change-of-Control Transactions
Neither state corporate laws nor federal securities laws include
remedies for collusion in change-of-control transactions." Congress,
26 Gretchen Morgenson, Just Saying No to Lowball Buyout Offers, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2007, § 3, at 1,
" Sec ROBERT H. BORE, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 19-21 (2d prtg. 1993).
28 For a description of the "New Gilded Age," see Louis Uchitelle, The Richest of the
Rich, Proud of a New Gilded Age, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at Al. Ben Stein has proposed
that courts ban such transactions entirely, calling them "yet another sad sign of how our
corporate trustees have lost their moral compass." Ben Stein, On Buyouts There Ought to Be a
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, § 3, at 3. Andrew Ross Sorkin has put forth a more modest
series of proposals under which investment bankers with conflicts of interest would be
precluded from financing going-private transactions. Under Sorkin's proposal, a majority
of shareholders would have to approve such transactions, and managements' business
plans would be disclosed to shareholders so that they could decide whether the company
could be operated more effectively by remaining public. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Rewriting the
Rules for Buyouts, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, § 3, at 4.
22 Henny Sender & Sarah Lueck, Tax Plan Adds to Pressura on Buyout Firms, WALL ST. J.,
June 16-17, 2007, at Al. In March 2007, union officials from fifteen countries called on
the industrialized countries to increase their regulation of buyout groups. Id. The House
Financial Services Committee held hearings in 2007 on private equity transactions. The
Chairman of the Committee, Barney Frank (D. Mass.), stated at that time, "When a small
number of individuals benefit from a particular deal in the tens and sometimes hundreds
of millions of dollars and concurrently, workers are laid off, we have a situation which
seems to inc wrong.... To the extent we see gross imbalances, then we're going to have to
act." Andrew Ross Sorkin, Sound and Fury over Private Equity, N.Y. Timm, May 20, 2007, § 3,
at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
" See infra notes 124-135 and accompanying text.
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however, need not enact any new laws to protect shareholders from
such collusion. The Sherman Act already includes an adequate means
of preventing such conduct. It is illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act for competitors to enter into any conspiracies or agreements "in
restraint of trade."' The classic antitrust violation involves a cartel, in
which sellers agree to refrain from competing against each other on
price or other terms of sale." Such agreements are routinely found to
be per se violations of the antitrust laws." In 2007, the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber
Co., that anticompetitive conduct by purchasers should be treated in the
same manner as anticompetitive conduct by sellers. 34 The federal
courts have held, in the context of a wide range of commercial transac-
tions, that it is per se illegal for competing buyers to engage in bid rig-
ging by agreeing to refrain from competing against each other for the
purchase of particular goods or services.35 It is now appropriate for the
courts to use such precedent to preclude collusion in change-of-control
transactions.
Shareholders have begun to file Sherman Act cases alleging that
potential purchasers have conspired to limit competition in company
auctions.36 A 2006 class action complaint stated that consortiums formed
by private equity firms to submit joint bids in going-private transactions
reduced the price received by shareholders and that the firms unlawfully
exchanged information and submitted bids at agreed-upon prices. 37
September 2006, the United States Department of Justice (the "DOJ")
began to investigate potential collusion among private equity firms."
The DOJ is focusing on contracts, correspondence, and e-mails in cer-
51 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
52 Sec Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among Com-
petitors, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1165-66 (2001).
33 See id. at 1165-67,
54 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1075 (2007) ("[Aj monopsony is to the buy side of the market what
a monopoly is to the sell side." (citing Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy
C.? Aforropsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 301, 320 (1991))).
" Sec infra notes 234-236 and accompanying text.
36 Sec U.S. Investors File Lawsuit Against 13 Buyout Firms, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Nov. 16, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 19867557 (describing class-action lawsuit).
37 See id.
38 See Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender, Private Equity Firms Face Anticompetitive Probe,
WA LL Sr. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at A3; Brent Shearer, Antitrust Inquiry Probes Club Deals, DEAL
MAKER'S JOURNAL, Dec. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 207622278; DO] Probes Private Eq-
uity Firms, RED HERRING, Oct. 11, 2006, http://www.redherring.com/Home/19112.
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tail] transactions that may indicate that "buyout firms have been rigging
corporate auctions. "39
D. The Proposed Approach to Collusion in Change-of-Control Transactions
The federal courts have erected several hurdles that prevent
shareholders from obtaining an antitrust remedy for collusion in a
change-of-control transaction. In 2007, for example, the United States
Supreme Court in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC u Billing held that
federal securities laws impliedly revoked the application of federal anti-
trust laws to the pricing conduct of underwriters in the IPOs of several
hundred technology companies." This Article explains, however, that
the Court's rationale in Credit Suisse, when considered in the context of
all the Court's decisions on implied revocation, should not preclude
the lower federal courts from applying the antitrust laws to change-of-
control transactions.
Once a shareholder surmounts the implied revocation issue, he
will encounter other hurdles to a successful suit against potential pur-
chasers that have colluded to reduce the purchase price in a change-of-
control transaction. The federal courts, for example, have made it diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to prevail against the types of implicit conspiracies
that are most likely to occur in company auctions.'" Because such im-
plicit arrangements are often more durable than express agreements to
limit competition, the courts' approach has had the perverse effect of
applying the most lenient approach to the most harmful types of anti-
competitive arrangements. This Article proposes a new approach to
analyzing implicit bid rigging in change-of-control transactions that
recognizes the adverse competitive effects of such arrangements and
deters potential purchasers from continuing to engage in such con-
duct.°
In recent years, potential purchasers have begun to form consorti-
ums with their competitors—also known as "clubs"—to submit joint
bids for companies. 43 In certain cases, such consortiums have a benefi-
cial competitive effect because they allow their members to participate
in bidding for a company that they did not have the ability to purchase
39 Dennis K. Berman, Cold Feet Aside, the Buyout Boom Has Legs, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2007,
at Cl.
40 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2397 (2007); see infin notes 174-186 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 259-265 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 250-270, 311-346, and accompanying text.
45 See Sorkin, supra note 12.
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on their own. 44
 In other cases, however, consortiums may reduce com-
petition for the purchase of a company by substituting a single bid for
what otherwise would have been multiple bids from each of the firms
participating in the consortium. 45 Consortiums among bidders in
change-of-control transactions are likely to be analyzed by the federal
courts in the same manner as other "joint ventures" among competi-
tors:46 During the last several decades, the courts have struggled to de-
fine standards for the legality of joint ventures. 47 The courts' confusion
has deterred American firms from entering into legitimate joint ven-
tures that could enhance their efficiency 48 This Article proposes a new
approach to the analysis of consortiums in change-of-control transac-
tions:49 The approach should allow the courts to distinguish more ef-
fectively between legal and illegal arrangements, thereby encouraging
potential purchasers to enter into consortiums that promote competi-
tion in change-of-control transactions and deterring them from par-
ticipating in consortiums that limit such competition.
E. Organization of this Article
Part 1 of this Article discusses how private equity firms have been
able to collude to reduce the prices paid for public companies to an
artificially low leve1.99 Part H explains why state corporate laws and fed-
eral securities laws have been unable to provide an effective remedy for
collusion in change-of-control transactions, leaving the federal antitrust
laws as the only potential means of preventing such conduct." Part III
explains how, under the relevant Supreme Court precedent, the anti-
44 See id.
45 Sec id.
46 Dennis W. Carlton Sc Steven A. Salop, You Keep Knocking but VON Can't Come in: Evalu-
ating Restrictions on Access to Input Joint Ventures, 9 HAIM J.L. & TECH. 319, 320 ("Current
antitrust analysis of rules governing access to joint ventures is both confused and contro-
versial.").
47 See Thomas S. Jorde & David j. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust, 4 HIGH
TECII 1..j. 1, 36 (1989) (stating that the courts' current approach to joint ventures "need-
lessly inhibits strategic alliances"); James Langenfeld & David Scheffman, Innovation and
U.S. Competition Policy, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 19 (1989) (pointing out that U.S. competi-
tion policy has been overtly or indirectly used to penalize innovation); Alan j. Meese, Fair-
well to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 AnrrrritusT U.
461, 497 (2000) ("[C]ase law and enforcement policy treat many [joint ventures] as inher-
ently suspect ... even if they might plausibly produce the sort of efficiencies ordinarily
cognizable under the Sherman Act.").
48 See infra notes 323-333 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 271-291, 347-386, and accompanying text.
5° See infra notes 57-123 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 124-139 and accompanying text.
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trust laws should continue to apply to anticompetitive conduct in
change-of-control transactions. 52
 Part IV proposes a new antitrust ap-
proach that will effectively deter collusion in change-of-control transac-
tions in a manner consistent with federal court precedent." The final
three parts explain how the proposed approach will deter express col-
lusion," tacit collusion, 55 and anticompetitive conduct undertaken in
connection with consortiams. 58
I. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT IN GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
A. The Economic Rationale of Going-Private Transactions
A new approach to the regulation of competition in change-of-
control transactions should begin with an understanding of how collu-
sion has occurred in recent years in the most prevalent type of acquisi-
tion, the going-private transaction. PriVate equity firms generally fund
such Transactions by increasing the amount of leverage in the com-
pany's capital structure, thereby increasing the risk—and potential re-
turn—to equity holders. In the last forty years, the popularity of such
transactions has peaked during periods of low interest rates and high
liquidity in the capital markets. Going-private transactions first became
widespread in the 1970s, when they were called "bootstraps," because of
buyout firms' ability to use an acquired company's assets to finance the
debt used to purchase the company.57 In the 1980s, such transactions
were called "leveraged buyouts," or "LBOs."58 The most famous lever-
aged buyout was the $25 billion takeover of RJR Nabisco by KKR in
1988. 59 The transaction was immortalized in the best-selling book (and
motion picture), Barbarians at the Gate, which criticized KKR for reduc-
ing employment, salaries, and benefits in order to repay the debt in-
52 See infra notes 142-217 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 218-297 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 298-310 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 311-346 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 347-386 and accompanying text.
57 Andrew Ross Sorkin, How to Show That You're No Gordon Geliko, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2007,§ 3, at 8.
58 Id.
59 Dennis K. Berman et al., KKR Is in Tams to Buy First Data, WA 1.1, ST. J., Apr. 2,2007, at
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curred in the transaction. 60
 The book described the 1980s LBOs in
words that are apt for today's private equity transactions:
In an LBO, a small group of senior executives, usually work-
ing with a Wall Street partner, proposes to buy its company
from public shareholders, using massive amounts of borrowed
money. Critics of this procedure called it stealing the com-
pany from its owners and fretted that the growing mountain
of corporate debt was hindering America's ability to compete
abroad. Everyone knew LBOs meant deep cuts in research
and every other imaginable budget, all sacrificed to pay off
debt. Proponents insisted the companies forced to meet stiff
debt payments grew lean and mean. On one thing they all
agreed: The executives who launched LBOs got filthy
By 2002, "private equity ... [became] the new, sanitized name for
the leveraged buyouts that had resulted in the scandals of the nineteen-
eighties."62 From 2002 until mid-2007, economic conditions were per-
fectly aligned for private equity transactions, as extremely low interest
rates and lax lending standards combined to make capital readily avail-
able to buyout firms.63 After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
the Federal Reserve Board (the "Fed") slashed interest rates, and, in
2003, cut the federal funds rate to 1% because of concerns about the
possibilitrof deflation. 64 At the same time, there was "an unanticipated
surge of capital pouring into the U.S. from overseas," as a result of what
Ben Remake, the Fed Chairman, has called a "global savings glut." 65 By
2006, driven by low interest rates and global liquidity; private equity
transactions were "smashing records from the 1980s." 66 Between 2005
and mid-2007, there were 1287 private equity transactions, with a total
value of $787 billion.67 Some of the largest and best-known American
companies were acquired by private equity firms between 2002 and
5° Id.; see also Jenny Anderson & Michael J. de la Merced, Kohlberg Kravis Plans to Go
Public, N.Y. Timis, July 4, 2007, at Cl (describing KKR as the buyout firm immortalized in
'Barbarians at the Gate'").
61 BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HRLYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NA Risco 5 (1990).
62 James B. Stewart, The Birthday Party, NEW YORKER, Feb. 11 & 18, 2008, at 100, 107.
"Greg Ip & Jon E. Hilsenrath, How Credit Got So Easy and Why It's Tightening, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 7, 2007, at Al.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
"Merced, supra note 7.
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2007, including Hertz Rent A Car, Neiman Marcus, Toys "R" Us, and
Chrysler. 65 By 2007, private equity firms were "sitting on an estimated
$1.5 trillion of spending power."69 KKR is "the industry doyen, flush
with cash and on a worldwide hunt for prey.""
James B. Stewart has explained the profit potential of the use of
leverage in private equity transactions:
The power of leverage is vast: if you invest ten dollars in an as-
set and sell it a year later for twelve, you have earned twenty
per cent. If you invest one dollar, borrow nine, pay a dollar in
interest on the debt ... and sell the asset for the same twelve
dollars, your return is one hundred per cent. 71
Henry Kravis stated in an interview in early 2007 that "I have
never seen a time like this when money is so available and so global." 72
As Gregory Zuckerman has explained, "Mostly, all the wheeling and
dealing stems from lots of money sloshing around the global markets,
as interest rates remain low. Investors are shoveling money at private-
equity firms, which buy public companies or businesses with an eye
toward reselling them later at a profit." 75 Ed Yardeni, the President of
Yardeni Research, has stated that "the low interest rates that make
bonds a relatively poor investment make it sensible to borrow and put
the money to work buying stock, one company at a time." 74
By late 2007, the private equity boom began to wane, as interest
rates increased and liquidity conditions in the credit markets tight-
ened.75 The Wall Street Journal explained that "the credit cycle's turn has
taken the easy money out of the buyout business."76 Economists
pointed out, however, that at some point the credit cycle would again
68 Colvin & Charan, supra note 8; Gina Choniason Singer & Jeffrey McCracken, Chrys-
ler Deal Heralds New Direction for Detroit, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2007, at Al.
89 Jeffrey Ball, Dennis K. Berman & Joann S. Lublin, Officials Fired at Dow Chemical for
Secret Talks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2007, at Al; see also Dennis K. Berman, Unusual Buyout
Offers a Piece to Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2007, at Al (stating that "spending power"
of private equity firms has been "estimated at $1.5 trillion by Morgan SLinley").
7° Sender, Berman & Smith, supra note 25.
71 Stewart, supra note 62, at 107.
72 Sender, Berman & Smith, supra note 25.
75 Gregory Zuckerman, Place Your Bets, Please: Takeover 117reel Spins, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22,
2006, at Cl.
74 Conrad de Aenlle, Stocks Cheap? Private Equity Thinks So, N.Y. TIN! ES, May 20, 2007,
§ 3, at 4.
75 Lauren Silva & Rob Cox, The Real Deal for Buyouts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2007, at C8;
see also Ip & Hilsenrath, supra note 63 (pointing out tightening conditions in the credit
markets).
79 Silva & Cox, supra note 75.
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turn in favor of going-private transactions." James Grant, the editor of
Grant's Interest Rate Observer, stated that "[t]he history is that lenders
move in great caravans between two extreme points, which we can call
stringency and accommodation," and he opined that "Menders will
move back to accommodation one day." 78 It is therefore likely that as
the credit cycle turns, private equity transactions will regain their popu-
larity, and the competitive problems raised by such transactions will re-
occur, as they have regularly during the last thirty years. As Robert
Pozen, the Chairman of MFS Investment Management, stated in De-
cember 2007, "Although private equity funds are currently on hold be-
cause of the credit crisis, they are very large and will return to action:"
B. Management's Conflict of Interest in Going-Private Transactions
There is an inherent conflict of interest between the managers and
the shareholders of public companies, stemming from the separation
of ownership and control in a public corporation. Although manage-
ment controls all of the day-to-day activities of a public company, it is
expected to run the company not in its own interest, but as the agent of
the company's owners—the shareholders. Because management has
control of a public company, it is difficult to resist the temptation to
operate the company in its own interests. Commentators have referred
to this conflict of interest as the "agency problem"—management is
required to act as the agent of the shareholders, but as an agent, man-
agement has the ability to act in its own interests instead. 80
The agency problem is particularly acute in going-private transac-
tions, where managers are included as members of the buyout team
and are usually promised large equity stakes in the new private entity. 81
Going-private transactions possess the classic characteristics of a conflict
" Floyd Norris, The Loan Comes Due, N.Y. Tim ES, Aug. 5, 2007, at WK1.
78 Id .
79 Robert C. Pozen, Target-Proof Your Company, W nu. ST. J., Nov. 23, 2007, at Al2.
a) See Gretchen Morgenson, It's Just a Matter of Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, § 3, at
1 ("[T]he so-called agency problem[] [is] a product of corporate structures that allow
managers—i.e., agents—to feather their own nests at the expense of owners—i.e., inves-
tors—whose interests they are supposed to serve."); see also Ben Stein, Enron, the Supreme
Court and Shareholders on the Brink N.Y TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, § 3, at 6 (stating that share-
holders are "the ultimate owner of a public company, the ultimate boss, the ultimate trus-
tor to whom the highest standards of fiduciary care [are] owed" and that these duties in-
clude "the duty to put the interests of the stockholder ahead of the interests of the
managers and their agents in each and every situation").
al Ball. Berman & Lublin, supra note 69; see also Morgenson, supra note 80 ("Agency
problems, precisely what private equity was supposed to eliminate, are cropping up as a
result of the disastrous changes made by these firms.").
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of interest, with management on both sides of the deal. 82
 Instead of be-
ing aligned with the interests of the public shareholders, management's
interests in a going-private transaction are most congruent with those
of the private equity firms that are purchasing the company. 83
When a company is offered for sale to a private equity firm, man-
agement has a fiduciary obligation to attempt to obtain the highest
possible price for the shareholders. 84 On the one hand, managers'
stock options and other equity incentive plans will motivate managers
to obtain such a high price. But, on the other hand, private equity firms
usually grant management an even greater amount of equity incentives
in the new private company formed after the purchase of shares from
the public shareholders. 85 Such equity grants induce management to
support the bid of the private equity firm that is most likely to acquire a
company at a lower price more favorable to management than to the
public shareholders.88 As the Wall Street fournat has explained, "Private
equity firms generally need the support of management when making a
bid for a public company. By giving management equity, that support is
usually forthcoming."87 "Suitors • promise big paydays, which typically
come in the form of an ownership stake—potentially 1% to 2% ... (of
larger companies]."8 In the $45 billion private. equity buyout of the
Texas utility company, TXU, in February 2007, the executives of TXU
were allowed to roll over their 5% equity interest into the new company
and were granted stock options that would allow them to acquire an
additional 5% of the company. 89 In the recent going-private transaction
involving Aramark Corporation, the company's Chief Executive Officer
converted his Aramark shares, valued at $250 million, into an equity
interest in the company after it was taken private. 98
as Ball, Berman, & Lublin, supra note 69; see also Morgenson, supra note 80.
83 See Morgenson, supra note 80.
84 See infra notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
86 See The LBO Boom's Real Fuel, WALL ST, J., Mar. 30, 2007, at B14 ("Ulf ... [manage-
ment] decide[s] to stay on they're normally lavished with large chunks of the newly privat-
ized company."). 'After the technology firm SunGard Data Systems was taken private in
the summer of 2005, senior managers received an equity stake that could be worth up to
15% of the company." Id.; see also On Going Private: Investors Beware, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 18-19,
2006, at B14 ("Private-equity firms often shower executives with incentives to stay and ei-
ther bring the company back to the public markets or sell it.").
as
 Ball, Berman & Lublin, supra note 69.
87 Rebecca Smith, Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender, Power Play: Bidders Try to Pre-
Empt Gridlock in TXU Dea4 WALL ST. j„ Feb. 26, 2007, at Al.
88 Ball, Berman & Lublin, supra note 69.
88 Smith, Berman & Sender, supra note 87.
80 Joseph Neubauer, Buyout Nets Aramark CEO $1B, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES
(Levittown, Pa.), Feb. 2, 2007, at B1, available at 20071AILNR 2128263.
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Several commentators have pointed out management's conflict of
interest in going-private transactions. James Woolery, an attorney at
Cravath, Swain & Moore LLP, has explained, "It's the absolute worst
way to negotiate as a public company .... It's like having someone
from an opposing team in your locker room during half time."91 Robert
Damon, a professor of finance at the Tepper School of Business at Car-
negie Mellon University, has explained, "Management is supposed to
serve shareholders and get the best price possible .... On the other
side, the same management is serving as the buyer and wants to sell the
company as cheaply as possible."92 Andrew Ross Sorkin has stated that
"[i]t's hard to understand how shareholders can trust management to
represent their interests when it is trying to make off with the company.
It's a conflict-ridden mess."'" "When you are both a buyer and a seller
of your company; how can you lose?"94 Ben Stein recently described
management's conflict of interest in stark terms:
[I]n a management buyout, management is seeking to pay
the least it can get away with for the assets of the public
holders, while the public holders want the most they can get.
On its face, this is an irreconcilable conflict of interest, ...
Why this kind of conflict is allowed is a mystery to me'
C. Management's Incentive to Keep Sales Prices Low in
Going-Private Transactions
Because management often will have a greater equity interest in
the new private company formed after a going-private transaction, it
will have an incentive to keep the price paid for the public company in
the original transaction as low as possible, in order to reap greater prof-
its on the later resale of the company to the public. 96 Thus, instead of
91 Ball, Berman & Lublin, supra note 69.
92
 Buyouts too Good to Managers?, BUCKS CO U N TY COURIER Tmsxs (Levittown. Pa.), Nov.
17, 2006, at BI, available at 2006 WLNR 20119812 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sorkin, supra note 28.
94 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Illuxling, Dealing and Reeling, N.Y. 'Thus, Dec. 31, 2006, § 3, at I.
95 Stein, supra note 28.
96 See Kimble Charles Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority Sham
holders in the Context of Going-Private Transactions, 2003 CoLust. Bus. L. REV. 191, 221 ("Go-
ing-private transactions in which controlling shareholders are members of the acquisition
group present a situation in which the opportunity for conflicts of interest is ripe. A party
exercising control over directors and officers stands to profit from an acquisition transac-
tion, and its interests diverge from those of other shareholders."). Managers faced with the
possibility of participating in a going-private transaction may also have the perverse incen-
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pursuing the shareholders' interest in maximizing the purchase price
for a public company, management will be inclined to facilitate collu-
sive conduct in the auction process that will reduce the price paid for a
public company.° It will be in management's interest to work with only
one potential buyer in the auction process and to exclude other poten-
tial buyers so that, with less competition, the price paid for the com-
pany is as low as possible. A low price means that management and the
private equity firms will be able to acquire equity in the new private
company at a lower cost basis. It also means that the company will not
be as highly leveraged with debt issued to purchase shares from the
public shareholders. A lower debt to equity ratio will make the com-
pany more attractive when it is sold a few years after the going-private
transaction. In the proxy sent to shareholders in connection with the
Aramark transaction, the buyout team even admitted that it was at-
tempting to "negotiate the terms of a transaction that would be most
favorable to themselves, and not to the stockholders of the company
and, accordingly, did not negotiate the merger agreement with the goal
of obtaining terms that were fair to such shareholders.” 98
D. Management's Ability to Control the Auction Process
Management has considerable leeway to control the terms of the
auction process in ways that limit the number of potential bidders. As
Dennis K. Berman has pointed out:
Plop executives carry enormous clout in buy out situations.
Their knowledge and influence can subtly, or not so subtly,
push a deal and its terms to a personally beneficial outcome.
And they can advance a favored deal so far along that com-
peting bidders won't come near 109
Andrew Ross Sorkin has explained:
tire to limit the company's profitability and business prospects prior to a buyout in order
to minimize the price paid for the company. As Henry Ellenbogen, a manager of the T.
Rowe Price Media and Telecommunications Fund, has explained, "As a marketplace, you
can't have an asset where people run it poorly, and put in incentives for them to cash it out
at a lower price." Dennis K. Berman & Sarah McBride, Clear Channel Showdown Signals In-
vestor Wariness of Private Buyouts, WALL ST. "Jan. 27-28, 2007, at Al,
97 See Berman & McBride, supra note 96.
9g Buyouts too Good to Managers?, supra note 92.
99 Dennis K. Berman, The Game: Fine Line of Selling, Selling Out, the Firm WALL. Si'. J.,
Jan. 30. 2007, at Cl. Indeed, the chief executives of some public companies have negoti-
ated the initial terms of going-private transactions with buyout firms without even inform-
ing their boards of directors of the potential transaction. Id.
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The seller decides whether a bid is high enough, and if it isn't,
there is no sale. The seller can typically also mange an auction
process however it wants. In some cases, sellers have selected
which private equity firms will be teamed up with one another,
to avoid any one team from becoming too strong. If a private
equity suitor objects to the process, it is invited to leave. 100
Management often asks an investment banker with which it already has
strong business ties to run the auction process.m For example, Gold-
man Sachs oversaw the auction process in the going-private transaction
for Clear Channel Communications. Goldman had been the long-time
banker for the Mays family, which controlled Clear Channel.' 02 In addi-
tion, Goldman provided $10 billion of financing for the transaction. 103
The "lightning-fast auction" conducted by Goldman produced only two
bids for the company. 104 Competing bidders were given only three
weeks "for researching and arranging financing for one of the largest
media transactions in history." 105 The only two bids were from groups
of private equity firms that were willing to retain management after the
company was taken private."
With its control over the auction process and the selection of the
outside advisors that oversee the process, management can easily steer a
transaction to a private equity firm that will provide a low price most
favorable to management." 7 Management's ability to select its pre-
ferred private equity firm facilitates collusion in the auction process for
public companies," Once management selects its preferred firm,
other potential buyers are less likely to bid, allowing the preferred
buyer to obtain a favorable price. 09 Under such circumstances, the pri-
vate equity firms excluded from the auction process have a greater in-
centive to reach an explicit or implicit understanding with the winning
bidder that it will step aside in future transactions in which another pri-
vate equity firm is selected by management as the preferred bidder.H°
100 Sorkin, supra note 24.
01 Sorkin, supra note 28.
102 Id,
I05
1°4 Sarah McBride & Dennis K. Berman, Clear Channel Buyout Talks Fuel Concern of Man-
agement Conflicts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2006, at Al.
IN Id.
106 Id.
107
	 Berman, supra note 99; Sorkin, supra note 24; Sorkin, supra note 28.
08 See Sorkin, supra note 24.
109
	 id,
110 See id.
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E. Evidence of "Windfall" Profits in Going-Private Transactions
There is substantial evidence that private equity firms have bene-
fited from purchasing companies at artificially low prices in going-
private transactions. 111 The New York Times recently described a work-
ing paper by the National Bureau of Economic Research that ana-
lyzed acquisitions of public companies completed from 1990 through
2005. 112 The study concluded that "target shareholders receive 55
percent more if a public firm instead of a private equity fund makes
the acquisition."' 13 The study "was unable to account for this disparity
in terms of any observable differences in the kind of companies that
were acquired." 134
 Jack LaPorte of T. Rowe Price New Horizons fund
has stated that strategic mergers among operating companies "have
historically been done at premiums of 20 percent to 25 percent above
the target's prevailing stock price," though recent private equity deals
"have resulted in premiums of only 10 percent to 15 percent." 115
Because they are purchasing public companies at artificially low
prices, managers and their favored private equity firms have been able
to reap extraordinary windfall profits in short periods of time. 116
Blackstone bought out the public shareholders of Celanese Corpora-
tion in 2004 and made back "nearly six times its investment" in the
transaction when it took the company public again in 2005. 117 The
company's executives received options for 7.8 million shares in the
new public company and the right to purchase another 1.6 million
shares at a deep discOunt from the public offer price. 1111 These equity
grants increased management's compensation in the IPO by $65 mil-
lion. 119 As the Wall Street Journal pointed out, "[I] t's hard to believe
1 " See Mark Hulbert, Shareholders Benefit When Managers Have a Serious Stake, N.V. Tod Es,
May 13, 2007, 3, at 5 (discussing Leonce Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So
Little Compared to Public Acquirers? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13061, 2007), available at hup://www.nbenorg/papers/w13061).
112 See id.
I " Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. "It was not the case, for example, that private equity firms tended to purchase
less profitable companies than public bidders did. Nor did private equity firms tend to
acquire companies that were growing more slowly, or ones whose recent stock perform-
ance was poorer." Id.
116
 Morgenson, supra note 26.
110 Sender & Langley, supra note 20.
117 Id.
118 John Christy, Rob Cox & Edward Chancellor, On Going Private: Investors Beware,
WALL Sr. J., Nov.'18-19, 2006, at 819.
119 Id.
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that Celanese's managers could have made such a pile without taking
the company private and at the price they did. "120
In 1988, Kraft, Inc. sold its battery subsidiary; Duracell, to KKR and
members of Duracell's management at a price of approximately $5 per
share. In 1996, Gillette bought Duracell for approximately $55 per
share, eleven times the price paid by management just eight years ear-
lier. 121
 The founder of Metromedia, John W. Kluge, took the company
private for approximately $43.50 per share and "sold off the pieces of
the company for about eight. times as much, making himself one of the
richest men in the nation off profits on assets that had belonged to
[the] public stockholders."' 22 Ben Stein has described memos from a
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") investigation of a pro-
posed going-private transaction involving Narragansett Capital, which
revealed "how much management and its investors expected to make
on their money; and how much they thought the assets were worth.
The profits were going to be breathtaking, and the amounts they were
paying [the shareholders] were comical compared with what the com-
pany was worth."'"
II. POTENTIAL REMEDIES AGAINST COLLUSION IN CHANGE-OF-
CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
Currently; shareholders can look to three regulatory areas for a
potential remedy against collusion in change-of-control transactions:
state corporate laws on managers' fiduciary duties, federal securities
statutes, and federal antitrust laws. Only the antitrust laws, however, are
capable of providing an effective remedy for such collusion.
A. State Corporate Laws on Managers' Fiduciary Duties
Under the relevant state corporate laws, managers of an acquired
company should not be liable when the purchase price for their com-
pany is reduced as a result of collusion among potential purchasers.
State corporate laws require management to observe its fiduciary duties
to shareholders by attempting to obtain the highest "available" price in
a change-of-control transaction. 12' In a change-of-control transaction,
120 Id.
121 Cannon, supra note 96, at 200.
122 Stein, .copra note 28.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43, 45 (Del,
1994) (holding that directors' approval of a merger transaction was subject to "enhanced
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however, managers can protect themselves from fiduciary liability by
observing certain procedural due process standards, such as disclosing
their conflict of interest in the transaction t ' 25
 referring the approval of
the transaction to a committee of independent directors, avoiding "no-
shop" or similar agreements that prevent competing bids, 126 and ob-
taining an opinion on the "fairness" of the transaction from an invest-
ment bank. 127
 Fairness letters are often tailored to benefit management
because it is management that selects and pays the fees of an invest-
ment banker. As Ben Stein has explained, "Investment banks never
cross management any more than appraisers cross lenders. Fairness
letters, like appraisals, are usually 'M.A.I.' —made as instructed."' 29ack
LaPorte of T Rowe Price has pointed out:
[D]irectors are increasingly hiding behind "independent
committees" of the boards and fairness opinions which Wall
Street firms will gladly provide, creating an outcome that
while technically meeting the legal requirements is really not
allowing companies to realize their long-term value. 129
Corporate managers can avoid the application of state fiduciary
laws entirely simply by proving that they made their best efforts to ob-
tain the highest available price in a change-of-control transaction. 130
They can, for example, assert that they attempted to convince the win-
scrutiny" because the stockholders were losing the opportunity to obtain a control pre-
mium in the future); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews Be Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182-85 (Del. 1986); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'Itolders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 199 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (holding that, in a going-private transaction, board likely violated its fiduciary
duty by failing to adequately explore alternative transaction with strategic buyer).
125
 See In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 98 (Del. Ch. 2007) (requiring dis-
closure in proxy statement for going-private transaction of benefits CEO would receive in
transaction).
125 See id. at 97-98 (finding that, in going-private transaction, board did not violate fi-
duciary duties because it retained "broad leeway to shop the company after signing, and
negotiated deal protection measures that did not present an unreasonable barrier to any
second-arriving bidder").
127
 See, e.g., Weinberger v. HOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-14 (Del. 1983); Solar Cells,
Inc. v, True North Partners, LLC, 2002 WL 749163, at *6 (Del. Ch. 2002); Cannon, supra
note 96, at 216 (stating that officers and directors can protect themselves against liability in
change-of-control transactions by obtaining an opinion as to the fairness of the acquisi-
tion bid from a financial advisor of the [Board's] choosing"); Stein, supra note 28
("Management and its worthy friends say that all is solved because it gets a 'fairness let-
ter' from an investment bank saying that the price it is offering for the stock is fair").
128 Stein, supra note 28.
129
 Morgenson, supra note 26.
190 See Sorkin, supra note 28.
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ning bidder to "bump" its bid above its original offer. 13] Even if private
equity firms agree among themselves to refrain from competing in an
auction or to form consortiums to submit joint bids, management can
argue that it had nothing to do with such decisions and was unable to
obtain additional offers for the company. If shareholders are disap-
pointed in the price received in a going-private transaction, their rem-
edy should lie against the private equity firms that colluded to limit
competition in the bidding process and not against the managers or
directors of the company, whose only recourse was to negotiate with the
firms willing to participate in the process.
B. Federal Securities Law Remedies
Neither federal securities laws nor SEC rules preclude potential
purchasers from conspiring to limit competition in auctions for the sale
of shares of public companies.'" Indeed, they do not contain any regula-
tion of bid rigging in transactions for the sale of public companies. 133
The Williams Act merely precludes "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulat-
ive" practices in the sale of the shares of a public company and requires
disclosure of any joint offer to purchase the shares of such a company. 134
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged in
1990 in Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., the SEC, in its regulations implement-
ing the Williams Act, has "chosen not to prohibit agreements between
rival bidders as fraudulent or manipulative practices once shareholders
are properly informed of them."135 As long as bidders observe the disclo-
sure provisions of the Williams Act, they will be deemed to be in compli-
ance with that law, even if they engage in an express bid-rigging conspir-
acy that would be per se illegal under the Sherman Act.'"
C. Antitrust Remedies
Unlike either state corporate law or federal securities laws, federal
antitrust laws were intended to compensate parties injured as a result of
anticompetitive conduct, including conspiracies among actual or po-
tential competitors in the purchase of goods or services.'" By imposing
131 Sa id.
X93
	
Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f) (2006).
"3 See id.
t" Id.
135 915 F.2d 824, 831 (2d Cir. 1990).
1M. See id.
197 See infra notes 228-236 and accompanying text.
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substantial sanctions (including treble damages and criminal liability),
antitrust laws could deter potential purchasers from limiting competi-
tion in the market for the purchase of control of public companies. In-
deed, in late 2006, the DOJ began to investigate the competitive prac-
tices of private equity firms in going-private transactions.'" Referring to
letters directed to four large private equity firms in connection with the
investigation, Andrew Ross Sorkin has concluded, "While it. was never
asked directly, the letters could have been only one sentence long: Are
you colluding to drive down buyout prices?'"13g
Unfortunately, the federal courts have erected several hurdles
against a successful antitrust suit by shareholders for the diminution in
the value of their shares caused by collusion in change-of-control trans-
actions.'" The most significant hurdle will be defendants' arguments
that, under Credit Suisse, the antitrust laws cannot apply to such collu-
sion at all because they have been impliedly revoked by the federal se-
curities laws."' As the next Section of this Article explains, however, a
proper reading of all the Supreme Court's decisions on implied revoca-
tion, including Credit Suisse, reveals that the antitrust laws can provide
an effective remedy against collusion in change-of-control transactions.
HI. APPLYING ANTITRUST LAWS IN CHANGE-OF-CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
The issue of implied revocation arises when antitrust laws poten-
tially preclude conduct that is permitted by another federal law or
regulation, and the law or regulation does not explicitly state whether
it precludes application of antitrust laws. 142 As the U.S. Supreme
Court stated in 2007 in Credit Suisse, in such cases the "courts must
determine whether, and in what respects [regulatory statutes] implic-
itly preclude application of the antitrust laws."143 In 1990, in Finnegan.
v. Campeau Cali., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the antitrust laws were impliedly revoked by the federal se-
curities laws when potential purchasers for a public company agreed
to end their bidding in an auction process.' 44 The Second Circuit's
138 See DOJ Probes Private Equity Firms, =lira note 38.
139 Sorkin, supra note 24.
14° See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2389 (2007) (hold-
ing that federal securities laws impliedly revoked application of federal antitrust laws in
pricing conduct of WO underwriters).
141 see id,
142 See, e.g., id.; Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 829
-30 (2d Cir. 1990).
'43 127 S. Ct. at 2389.
144 915 F.2d at 829-30.
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decision in Finnegan has broad implications for the enforcement of
the antitrust laws when potential purchasers engage in bid rigging in
change-of-control transactions. If Finnegan were applied in such cases,
shareholders would have no remedy for the diminution in the value
of their shares resulting from such anticompetitive conduct. 145 The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Credit Suisse, however, has clarified
the standard for determining whether the federal securities laws im-
pliedly revoke the antitrust laws. 146 Although the Supreme Court's
decision is not directly applicable to change-of-control transactions,
the Court's approach should ensure that Finnegan will no longer be
considered good law and that the antitrust laws will apply to bid rig-
ging in change-of-control transactions for public companies. 147
A. Finnegan &Antitrust in. Change-of-Control Transactions
In Finnegan, the shareholders of Federated Department Stores
("Federated") alleged that two rival bidders, R.H. Macy & Co., Inc.
("Macy's") and Campeau Corp. ("Campeau"), violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act by agreeing to discontinue their bidding to purchase
Federated. 148 In March 1988, Macy's and Campeau pushed up the price
of Federated stock as they each submitted progressively higher bids, 149
In April 1988, Macy's agreed to withdraw its bid in exchange for an
agreement by Campeau to pay Macy's $60 million for banking and legal
expenses and to allow Macy's to purchase two divisions of Federated. 15°
As a result of this agreement, Campeau was able to purchase Federated
for $172 million less than Macy's most recent bid.'"
The Second Circuit concluded that the bidding arrangement be-
tween Macy's and Campeau could not be illegal under the Sherman
Act because it was permitted under the Williams Act. 152 The court
pointed out that the Williams Act gave the SEC the authority to (1) re-
quire the disclosure of bidding arrangements among the purchasers of
public companies, such as the one between Macy's and Campeau, and
(2) regulate any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices by
145
 See Id.
146 See Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2390.
147 See Id.
148 Finnegan, 915 F.2d at 826,
149 Id.
150 Id. (taking Macy's agreement to withdraw its bid as fact for the purposes of its re-
view).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 830-31.
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bidders for public companies. 153 The Second Circuit concluded that,
because the SEC had the power to regulate bidders' agreements, it had
implicitly authorized such agreements. 154 Permitting an antitrust suit
against such agreements "would foster a direct conflict between the se-
curities and antitrust laws." 155
 Accordingly, the court found that the an-
titrust laws were impliedly revoked by the securities laws and that the
complaints of the Federated shareholders against Macy's and Campeau
should be dismissed. 156
B. Supreme Court Precedent Prior to Credit Suisse
There is a long history of Supreme Court jurisprudence on im-
plied revocation, stretching back to the early 1960s. 07 The Court's de-
cisions indicate that the antitrust laws should only be deemed to be im-
plied!), revoked in those narrow circumstances in which the SEC has
exercised its authority to permit a specific type of competitive conduct
that would have been illegal under the antitrust laws."8
In 1963, in Silver u New York Stock Exchange, Inc., the Court consid-
ered whether the federal securities laws impliedly revoked the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws to the refusal by the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") to permit nonmembers to access its private telephone con-
nections. 09 Emphasizing the "cardinal principle of construction that
repeals by implication are not favored," the Court concluded that "re-
peal [of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied only if necessary
to make the ... [securities laws] work, and even then only to the mini-
mum extent necessary:160 Because the SEC had no power to supervise
enforcement of the rules regulating the NYSE, the Court held that en-
forcement of the antitrust laws would not disturb the SEC's regulatory
scheme)"
155 Finnegan, 915 F.2d at 830-31.
154 Id. at 831.
155 Id. at 830 ("We cannot presume that Congress has allowed competing bidders to
make a joint bid under the William Acts and the SEC's regulations and taken that right
away by authorizing suit against such joint bidders under the antitrust laws.").
156 Id. at 832.
157 See generally United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975);
Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. N.Y Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341 (1963).
158 See ?Van Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 719-20; Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682; Silver, 373
U.S. at 357.
155 373 U.S. at 342-43.
16° Id. at 357.
161 Id. at 360.
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In 1975, in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., the Court con-
sidered whether it was illegal under the Sherman Act for the NYSE and
the American Stock Exchange to set fixed commission rates) 62 The ex-
changes argued that, because the SEC was given direct authority under
the Securities and Exchange Act to regulate and fix reasonable com-
mission rates, the antitrust laws could not also regulate such rates)"
The Court acknowledged that an "implied repeal" of the antitrust laws
could only be found "where there is a 'plain repugnancy' between the
antitrust and regulatory provisions."'" The Court, however, agreed with
the exchanges that the antitrust laws were inapplicable to their con-
duct, emphasizing the active role that the SEC had taken in ensuring
that commission rates were adequately regulated. 165 In the Court's
opinion, subjecting brokers' commissions to antitrust regulation would
conflict with the SEC's regulation of such commissions.'"
United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., which the
Supreme Court decided on the same day as Gordon, involved various
restrictions imposed by the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"), mutual fund companies, and broker-dealers on the trading
of mutual fund shares in the secondary market after the initial distribu-
tion of mutual fund shares. 167 The defendants argued that the antitrust
taws were impliedly repealed by the Investment Company Act of 1940,
which gave the SEC the right to regulate the sale of mutual fund
shares)" As in Gordon, the Court concluded that the SEC had exer-
cised regulatory authority over the relevant conduct)" The SEC's deci-
sion not to prohibit the restrictions on trading securities in the secon-
dary market reflected its implicit authorization of such conduct)" That
authorization could not be reconciled with application of the antitrust
laws, under which the restrictions would have been per se illegal."'
162 422 U.S. 659, 660 (1975).
163 Id. at 688-89.
164 Id, at 682 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963)).
166 Congress had specifically granted the SEC the power to fix and insure reasonable
rates" of commission, id. at 666, and the SEC had effectively authorized the use of fixed
rates during the relevant tune period. Id. at 667-75.
156 Id. at 689.
167 422 U.S. at 701-03.
168
 Id. at 704.
Iss Id. at 721.
170
	 at 728, 733.
171 Id. at 729, 733.
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C. The Supreme Court's Current Approach: Credit Suisse
The plaintiffs in Credit Suisse were sixty investors in stock issued by
internet and technology companies during the stock market bubble of
the late 1990s.' 72 They filed two class actions alleging that, at the heart
of the dot-cons boom, ten leading investment banks, acting as under-
writers, conspired to inflate aftermarket stock prices in IPOs for several
hundred technology companies." The suits alleged that the under-
writers had, among other things, agreed among themselves to require
investors to pay anticompetitive charges "over and above the agreed-
upon IPO share price plus underwriting commission."'" The plaintiffs
claimed that such conduct was designed to inflate the price of securities
in the aftermarket after the completion of an IPO and that the conduct
constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade tinder Section 1 of the
Sherman Act." The defendants argued that, because the SEC regu-
lated their conduct in IPOs, the conduct should be exempt from anti-
trust liability. 176 In its 2007 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with
the defendants, holding that the antitrust laws were impliedly revoked
by the securities laws for the conduct challenged in the complaints.'"
The Court acknowledged that its prior cases had established that
the antitrust laws could only be impliedly revoked by the federal securi-
ties laws when there was "a plain repugnancy" between antitrust and se-
curities regulation." The Court set forth a strict four-factor test for de-
termining when the antitrust laws are impliedly revoked by the federal
securities laws: (1) the conduct at issue must be "squarely within the
heartland of securities regulation," (2) the SEC must have "clear and
adequate ... authority to regulate" the conduct, (3) the SEC must be
engaged in "active and ongoing ... regulation," and (4) there must exist
"a serious conflict between the antitrust and regulatory regimes." 179
The Court held that all four of these factors were satisfied in Credit
Suisse.18° First, the underwriters' efforts "jointly to promote and sell
newly issued securities ... were central to the proper functioning of
172 Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2388.
rts
174 Id. at 2389.
175 Id.
176 Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 426 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct.
2383.
In Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2389.
178 Id. at 2390.
179 Id.
we Id. at 2397.
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well-regulated capital markets." 181 Second, "the law grants the SEC au-
thority to supervise" the underwriters' conduct. 182 Third, "the SEC has
continuously exercised its legal authority to regulate" the conduct in
which the underwriters had engaged. 183 Fourth, the Court concluded
that there was a "serious conflict between the antitrust and regulatory
regimes."184 The Court believed that, if antitrust suits against under-
writers were permitted for IPO-related conduct, it would be difficult for
fact-finders to separate conduct that the SEC permits from conduct
that it forbids. 185 Under such circumstances, courts were likely to apply
the antitrust laws too broadly, causing underwriters to avoid "a wide
range of joint conduct that the securities law permits or encourages." 186
D. Applying Supreme Court Precedent to Collusion in Change-
of-Control Transactions
The entire body of Supreme Court precedent supports the con-
clusion that the antitrust laws are not impliedly revoked by the securi-
ties laws with respect to collusion in public change-of-control transac-
tions. 187 Indeed, it is impossible to reconcile the Second Circuit's
decision in Finnegan, which found the antitrust laws inapplicable in
such situations, with the Supreme Court's decisions in Silver, Gordon,
NASD, and Credit Suisse) 88 In those cases, the Court emphasized that
implied revocation of the antitrust laws was never favored and that it
should only occur when there was a clear conflict between the anti-
trust laws and the specific provisions of another regulatory statute. 189
The Court only found implied revocation in Gordon, NASD, and Credit
Suisse because the SEC had been granted specific authority to regulate
the conduct at issue and had affirmatively exercised that authority to
approve conduct that would have been prohibited by the antitrust
laws. 19° In Credit Suisse, the SEC had allowed underwriters to engage in
181 Id. at 2392.
18"_
	 Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2392.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 2393-97.
185 Id .
186 Id. at 2396.
187 Sec Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2390; Nat? Ass it of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 719-20;
Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682; Silver, 373 U.S. at 357.
las Sec Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2390; Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 719-20;
Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682; Silver, 373 U.S. at 357; Finnegan, 915 F.2d at 831.
188 See Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2390; Nat'l Ass'rz of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 719-20;
Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682; Silver, 373 U.S. at 357.
19° See Nat'l Ass '11 of See Dealers, 422 U.S. at 721; Gordon, 422 U.S. at 667-75.
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the challenged pricing activities in the PO aftermarket; 191
 in Gordon,
the SEC had authorized the use of fixed commission rates on the
stock exchanges; 192 and in NASD, the SEC had decided to allow the
mutual fund companies and broker-dealers to restrict the trading of
mutual fund shares in the secondary market. 193
 In such cases, there
was a clear potential for the antitrust laws to conflict with the en-
forcement activities of a federal agency.'"
Contrary to the Second Circuit's reasoning in Finnegan, there is no
such potential for conflict in change-of-control transactions. The Wil-
liams Act, which regulates the trading of securities in change-of-control
transactions, requires disclosure of joint-bidding arrangements and
gives the SEC the authority to regulate fraudulent or manipulative
practices. 195 The Williams Act, however, does not include any provisions
designed to protect competition, 196
 and the SEC has not issued any
rules regulating competition in change-of-control transactions. 197 As
the Finnegan court conceded, the SEC has "chosen not to prohibit
agreements between rival bidders as fraudulent or manipulative prac-
tices."198 Because the SEC has declined to prescribe any remedy other
than disclosure for joint-bidding arrangements, the role it plays in the
tender-offer process does not conflict with the antitrust laws.'" As 'Wil-
liam T. Reid IV has pointed out,
The mere contemplation of bidding arrangements [under
the Williams Act] does not justify the preclusion of the anti-
trust laws.... Since the SEC's authority extends solely to is-
sues related to disclosure, and it is not empowered to protect
competition affirmatively, the Sherman Act can function
without impeding the . SEC's authority 2oo
None of the four factors set forth in Credit Suisse as preconditions
to implied antitrust revocation applies to collusion in change-of-
191 Sec Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2392.
192 See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 667-75.
103 See Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 704,721.
194 See Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2392-97; Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 719-20;
Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682.
195 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n(d)—(f) (2006).
198 See William T. Reid IV, Implied Repeal of the Sherman Act via the Williams Act: Finnegan
v. Campeau Corp, 65 &r., mm's L. REV. 965,974 (1991).
197 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200-301 (2008).
198 915 F.2d at 831.
199 Sec Reid, supra note 196, at 974.
20 Id. at 971,974.
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control transactions."' First, the competitive behavior of potential
purchasers of public companies is not even remotely "an area of con-
duct squarely within the heartland of securities regulation." 202 Rather,
collusion lies at the heart of the Sherman Act's prohibition of con-
spiracies in restraint of trade.203 Second, the SEC does not have "clear
and adequate ... authority to regulate" collusion in change-of-control
transactions.204 Indeed, the SEC has no authority at all to regulate
competitive conduct; its authority extends only to regulating disclo-
sure of joint-bidding agreements and any fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative conduct in connection with tender offers. 205 Third, the
SEC is not engaged in "active and ongoing ... regulation" of collu-
sion.206 In fact, as the Finnegan court pointed out, the SEC has af-
firmatively declined to prohibit agreements between rival bidders in
change-of-control transactions. 207
The fourth factor—a serious conflict between antitrust and other
regulatory regimes—gave the Court the greatest concern in Credit
Su isse."8 The Court believed that, with respect to underwriters' conduct
IPOs, "only a fine, complex, detailed line separates activity that the
SEC permits or encourages ... from activity that the SEC must ... for-
bid."209 Thus, "by permitting plaintiffs to dress what is essentially a secu-
rities complaint in antitrust clothing,"210 the courts could deter "a wide
range of joint conduct that the securities law permits or encourages." 2 "
These concerns are not applicable to collusion among potential
purchasers in change-of-control transactions. The lines between collu-
sive conduct and failures to disclose joint-bidding arrangements in
change-of-control transactions are much easier to draw. Unlike the IPO-
related conduct in Credit Suisse, fact-finders cannot confuse collusion in
the bidding process for a public company with a failure to properly dis-
close a joint-bidding arrangement under the Williams Act. The anti-
trust laws deal with an entirely different aspect of joint bidding than is
2°1 See Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2390.
202 See id. at 2397.
209 See Piraino, supra note 32, at 1165-66.
2° 4 Id.
"5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n (d)—(0.
206 Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2397.
2°7 Finnegan, 915 F.2d at 831.
206 Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2393-97.
2°9 Id. at 2394.
21° Id. at 2396.
2" Id.
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regulated by the securities laws,212
 The antitrust laws preclude collusion
in changes of control, whereas the federal securities laws regulate dis-
closure of joint bidding. 2 " Thus, antitrust enforcement against collu-
sion carries no risk of deterring conduct that the Williams Act permits
or encourages 2 1 '1 Indeed, the SEC's requirement that joint-bidding ar-
rangements be disclosed includes no express or implied approval of
anticompetitive behavior occurring in connection with such arrange-
ments.215
If the antitrust laws did not apply in change-of-control transac-
tions, public shareholders would have no remedy for the diminution in
the value of their shares resulting from collusion to limit competition
for the purchase of public companies.216 Furthermore, if federal courts
allowed.disclosure statutes such as the securities laws to revoke the anti-
trust laws, there would be no limit to conduct that was immunized from
antitrust review. Certain joint ventures, for example, must be disclosed
to the government for review under the Hart-Scott-Rodin° Act. 217 A
defendant accused of conspiring with its joint venture partner to fix
prices should not be able to argue that the antitrust laws do not apply
to such conduct simply because the joint venture was disclosed under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
212 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n(d)—(f); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
596, 608 (1972) (applying per se rule to territorial restraints implemented by group of
grocery stores); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967).
21! See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n (d)—(1); Tape°, 405 U.S. at 608 (applying per se rule
to territorial restraints implemented by group of grocery stores); Sealy, 388 U.S. at 355.
214 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n (d)—(f); Topco, 405 U.S. at 608 (applying per se rule
to territorial restraints implemented by group of grocery stores); Sealy, 388 U.S. at 355.
215 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n (d)—(f).
215 See supra notes 124-132 and accompanying text. Even if Finnegan were good law, it
should not be construed to impliedly revoke the antitrust laws in cases involving express
agreements to limit bidding in auctions for public companies. A naked agreement among
potential purchasers to refrain from bidding would not constitute a joint-bidding ar-
rangement within the meaning of the Williams Act. The Williams Act only requires disclo-
sure of bidding arrangements when purchasers join forces to submit a common hid for the
purchase of a company. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. There is no disclosure
requirement when potential purchasers simply agree to refrain from participating in the
auction process. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. Thus, a defendant could not
point to any possible conflict between the antitrust laws and the federal securities laws
under such circumstances.
217 See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2006).
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IV. A PROPOSED ANTITRUST APPROACH TO COLLUSION IN CORPORATE
CHANGES OF CONTROL
A. Recognizing the Price-Depressing Effects of Bid Rigging
The federal courts should adopt a new approach to corporate
change-of-control transactions recognizing that the federal antitrust
laws are the only viable means of protecting shareholders against the
price depressing effects of bid rigging. State corporate laws focus on
corporate governance processes and are not designed to ensure a
competitive market for corporate contro1. 218 Under state corporate law,
management can insulate itself from liability for collusion in change-of-
control transactions simply by following certain procedural due process
guidelines. 219 Federal securities laws protect investors in change-of-
control transactions by requiring disclosure of joint-bidding arrange-
ments; however, they do not deal with the substantive competitive con-
duct of potential purchasers in change-of-control transactions. 22° After
Credit Suisse, however, there should be no question that the antitrust
laws can provide a remedy for the economic loss suffered by sharehold-
ers as a result of collusion in change-of-control transactions. 221 Thus, it
is now appropriate for the federal courts to develop a more effective
approach to such conduct,
The new approach to change-of-control transactions should rec-
ognize what economists have emphasized for years: collusion in
change-of-control transactions harms shareholders by artificially reduc-
ing the price they receive in such transactions. 222 Economic studies
have demonstrated that collusion among bidders in an auction process
for any commodity has the effect of reducing the price received by a
seller.223 These studies indicate that "even a mild degree of collusion"
can result in larger sale price differences— "on the order of 20%" —for
sellers. 224 In any auction, competing bidders drive up the price for the
relevant commodity. The situation is no different in auctions for the
218 See Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 CAL. L. REV.
1365, 1386 (1989).
219 See In is Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 97-98 (Del. 2007).
22° See Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n (d)—(f) (2006).
221 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2390 (2007).
222 See 'Robert, supra note 111.
225 See, e.g., Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, Empirical Models of Auctions, Lecture for the
Ninth World Congress of the Economic Society 36 (Mar. 13, 2006) (on file with author)
("[C]ollusion can easily depress ascending auction prices below the observed levels.").
224 Id
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purchase of control of a company. If there are fewer bidders, the price
for a company, like that of any other commodity, will fall. One study has
found that "target shareholders receive a premium of 42-46% in mul-
tiple-bidder tender offers, compared to a premium of 26-30% in single-
bidder offers."226 Joshua Fried has emphasized the adverse effects of
collusion among potential purchasers in change-of-control transac-
dons: "Collusive bidding ... tends to reduce the price paid to share-
holders ... because it eliminates the competition ,"226
 Edward Rock has
pointed out that "an agreement among bidders competing for control
[of a company], like a bidding agreement in any other market, trans-
fers wealth from target shareholders to acquirers. The seller loses a
benefit of competition, namely, the chance to play one buyer off
against others, in an attempt to increase the bid."227
Potential purchasers can collude in three different ways to reduce
the price paid in a change-of-control transaction: (1) by expressly
agreeing among themselves to avoid competition, (2) by reaching an
implicit understanding on limiting competition, and (3) by participat-
ing in bidding consortiums that eliminate competition. The following
Subsections explain how the proposed approach would deter each of
these forms of anticompetitive conduct.
B. Deterring Express Collusion
Naked agreements among competing sellers to fix the prices of
their products have been considered per se illegal since the earliest
days of the Sherman Act.228
 Courts and commentators refer to such
price fixing arrangements as "cartels." 229
 Although the federal courts
have taken a less aggressive approach in many antitrust areas during
the last three decades, they have never wavered in their condemna-
226 Rock, supra note 218, at 1372-73.
226 Joshua M. Fried et al., Collusive Bidding in the Market for Corporate Control, 79 NEB. L.
REV. 48, 73 (2000).
227 Rock, supra note 218, at 1373.
228 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898) (refus-
ing to consider possible justifications for horizontal price fixing).
228 See Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Presentation Before the Antitrust Section of the A.B.A.: The Incredible Shrinking Per Se
Rule: Is an End in Sight? (Mar. 2004) (on file with author) ("The area in which the per se
rule continues to be invoked most often, and continues to have real bite, is that of the
hard-core cartel. By the term 'hard-core cartel,' antitrust lawyers normally mean an
agreement between horizontal competitors to fix prices or to engage in equivalent
behaviors.").
1002	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:971
Lion of price fixing by sellers. 230 In 2004, Justice Scalia (rarely an advo-
cate of aggressive antitrust enforcement) described cartels among
sellers as "the supreme evil of antitrust," 231 and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit has concluded that "no antitrust violation
is more abominated than the agreement to fix prices."232 Because the
anticompetitive effects of seller cartel arrangements are so clear, the
courts have not been willing to consider any procompetitive justifica-
tions offered by sellers engaged in price fixing. 233
The courts and agencies should take a similarly harsh approach
to express agreements among buyers to limit competition. The Su-
preme Court pointed out in its 2007 decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., that the courts should treat anti-
competitive conduct by purchasers no more leniently than anticom-
petitive conduct by sellers.234 Bid-rigging arrangements among buyers
are just as harmful to competition as agreements among sellers to fix
prices. 235 The only effects of such conspiracies are to prevent competi-
tion among buyers on input prices and to reduce the price of inputs,
to the detriment of sellers. As Edward Rock has pointed out, "Bidding
agreements are simply one form of price fixing, the archetypal exam-
ple of a per se violation of the Sherman Act.... Price fixing among
buyers is every bit as illegal as price fixing among sellers."236
In other markets, bid-rigging arrangements have been precluded
on their face as per se violations of the antitrust laws. 237 Indeed, bid rig-
ging is routinely prosecuted by the Department of Justice (the "DOD
23° See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984) ("We have never required
proof of market power in such a case."); Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
347 (1982) ("We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule against price fix-
ing."); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1990) (applying per se
rule to price fixing).
231 Verizon Commc'ns., Inc. v Trinko, 590 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
232
 Dagher v. Saudi Ref., Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), reti'd sub nom, Tex-
aco, Inc. V. Dagher, 597 U.S. 1 (2006).
233 See NCIA, 468 U.S. at 110; Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 347; Socony-lircurtur, 310 U.S. at 218.
234
 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Sinunons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1075
(2007) (citing John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group
Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?, 72 ArrrrritusT
L.J. 625, 652 (2005); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Buyers' Competi-
tive Conduct, 56 HASflNGS U. 1121, 1125 (2005)).
235 See Rock, supra note 218, at 1407.
236 id.
237 See, e.g., United Slates v. Seville Indus. Mach. Co., 696 F. Stipp. 986, 989 (D.N.J.
1988).
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as a criminal violation of the Sherman Act 238
 There is no reason why
bid rigging in change-of-control transactions should be treated more
leniently. Shareholders of American companies should be en tided to
the same protection from bid rigging as the sellers of other commodi-
ties. Such agreements are just as anticompetitive as any other bid-
rigging arrangements, and they can cause substantial economic harm
to the shareholders of companies that receive a lower price as a result
of collusion among potential bidders. For example, in the 1988 battle
for control of Federated, Campeau and Macy's agreed to stop bidding
against each other after concluding that a "bidding frenzy" for the
company had begun to build. 239 This agreement allowed Campeau to
purchase Federated from its shareholders for $172 million less than
Macy's most recent bid. 24° The conspiracy among these two potential
purchasers fixed the price for Federated at a lower level just as surely as
price-fixing agreements among sellers fix prices at higher levels.24 '
Express bid rigging in change-of-control transactions is most likely
to occur among strategic buyers who have already begun to participate
• in a company auction process. 242
 In the typical case, one bidder agrees
to drop out of the auction process in exchange for cash or an agree-
ment by the successful bidder to sell a portion of the company to the
withdrawing bidder after the transaction is completed. 243 In the Feder-
ated transaction, for example, Macy's agreed with Campeau to with-
draw from the bidding process, and Campeau agreed, in return, to pay
Macy's $60 million and to sell two divisions of Federated to Macy's. 244
There have been many other examples of express agreements among
strategic buyers to terminate the bidding process in a company auction.
In 2002, both Global Crossing and Qwest Communications bid to ac-
quire two communications companies: Frontier and US West. 245
"Rather than engage in a bidding war, the rival suitors agreed to split
the prizes, with Global Crossing getting Frontier while Qwest acquired
U.S. West. "246 Similarly, Bethlehem Steel and Allegheny Teledyne each
258 See R. Preston McAfee et al., Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers, 2 J. EcoN. &
Nicht'''. STRATEGY 449, 450 (1993).
239 Rock, supra note 218, at 1368.
24o Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1990).
2.41 See id.
242 See id.
242
 See id.
244 Id.
245 Fried, supra note 226, at 50.
246 id.
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attempted to acquire Lukens Stee1. 247 Allegheny Teledyne agreed to
drop out of the bidding after Bethlehem agreed to sell certain assets of
Lukens to Allegheny Teledyne. 248 Finally; when Comcast and AT&T
each bid to acquire MediaOne, Comcast agreed to withdraw its offer
after AT&T agreed to sell its cable systems in Baltimore and Washing-
ton D.C. to Comcast. 249
Express bid-rigging arrangementS in change-of-control transac-
tions have no purpose other than to limit competition and no effect
other than to artificially decrease the price received by shareholders.
Assume, for example, that KKR and the Blackstone Group each made
separate bids to purchase General Motors and take the company pri-
vate. Henry Kravis, concerned that a bidding war for Blackstone would
raise the price for General Motors, calls Stephen Schwarzman and sug-
gests that, if Blackstone drops out of the bidding for General Motors,
KKR would decline to bid on the next large transaction in which Black-
stone is interested. Mr. Schwarzman acquiesces to Mr. Kravis' sugges-
tion, and KKR, as the sole bidder, is successful in purchasing General
Motors. Such an agreement would eliminate all competition among the
firms for the purchase of General Motors. Instead of receiving a full
market price, the shareholders of General Motors would only receive
the lower price that KKR was willing to pay. A court or agency should
not have to inquire any further to conclude that such an arrangement
constitutes an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
C. Deterring Implicit Collusion
"Game theory" has explained how firms in oligopolistic markets
make their decisions "in reference to the likely reaction of competi-
tors."2" It is easier tacitly to communicate, monitor, and observe a con-
sensus form of conduct when only a few firms are involved. Oligopolists
are more likely to know each other well, to understand each other's
business strategies, and to be able to anticipate the reaction of their
rivals to particular competitive conduct.
The private equity market possesses the classic characteristics of an
oligopoly that facilitates implicit collusion. Approximately seven U.S.-
247 Id.
248 Id.
240 Id, at 50-51.
2" Robert A. Milne & Jack E. Pace m, The Scope of Expert Testimony on the Subject of Con-
spiracy in a Sherman Act Case, ANTrrRusT, Spring 2003, at 36, 37 (emphasis omitted).
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based private equity firms have the financial capacity to bid alone on
transactions with a value of more than $4 billion: KKR, Blackstone, the
Goldman Sachs Group ("Goldman"), TPG (formerly the Texas Pacific
Group), Bain Capital, the Carlyle Group ("Carlyle"), and Providence
Equity Partners ("Providence"). 2" In 2007, KKR and Blackstone were
the largest private equity firms, "[Waving just finished raising new su-
persize funds ... each worth more than $20 billion."252
 Goldman is
close behind KKR and Blackstone, with a $19 billion fund, followed by
TPG, with $15 billion in assets. 253
The same seven private equity firms will usually be the only fi-
nancial buyers capable of pursuing a going-private transaction 'with
the largest American companies. These firms are able to observe each
others' conduct over an extended period, as they compete to pur-
chase a series of companies that are interested in going private. This
familiarity makes it easier for the private equity firms to anticipate
their rivals' interest in a particular transaction. These firms can subtly
signal to each other the companies for which each firm is willing to
bid aggressively. Over a period of time, the firms can establish a pat-
tern under which they take turns in bidding for their preferred com-
panies. The implicit understanding reached by the firms can reduce
competition in change-of-control transactions just as effectively as an
express bid-rigging arrangement.
Business executives as sophisticated as Messrs. Kravis and
Schwartzman are not likely to propose overt conduct that constitutes a
bald violation of the antitrust laws. They are much more likely to coor-
dinate their conduct by implicitly signaling their intentions as to
whether they plan to bid for a particular company. Consider a hypo-
thetical going-private transaction for General Motors. 254 If KKR and
231 See MacFadyen, supra note 10; PEI50: The List, PRIVATF. EQUITY INT'L, May 2007, at 2,
available at hup://www.peimedia.com/resources/Conference/domt loads/PEI5O_Brochure_
final.pdf (listing the top-fifty private equity firms' capital raised over the 2002-2007 period).
The determination that approximately seven private equity firms can bid on such transac-
tions is an assumption. It uses the PEI50 data and assumes that a firm (1) would use equity
capital to finance at least 40% of the bid price and (2) would invest no more than 10% of its
capital in any one transaction. Thus, only firms with at least $16 billion in committed capital
would be able to bid alone on transactions of $4 billion and above.
232 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Clifford Krauss, At $45 Billion, New Contender for Top Buyout,
N.Y. Tim ES, Feb. 24, 2007, at Al.
233 Sender, Berman & Smith, supra note 25, at Al; Benny Sender, Goldman Joins Private
Equity's Upper Echelon, W ALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at Cl.
234 A going-private transaction involving General Motors may be more than theoreti-
cal. In the summer of 2007, takeover speculation "made investors believe that GM could be
next" in going private. Gregory Zuckerman, After GAI's Labor Pact, It's Tints to Kick the
1006	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:971
Blackstone wanted to avoid competition that could increase the price
for General Motors, they would be better served by an implicit rather
than an express understanding as to which party would be allowed to
bid for General Motors. The parties could reach such an implicit un-
derstanding by engaging in a pattern of conduct making clear their
mutual intention to avoid head-to-head competition. Because only ap-
proximately seven private equity firms are currently capable of bidding
for companies as large as General Motors, it would be easy for KKR to
signal to Blackstone and to the other five private equity firms that, if
they declined to bid for General Motors, KKR would refrain, in turn,
from bidding on the next large transaction. A pattern of "you take this
one, 1 will take the next one" could be established in several different
ways. It may, for example, become evident over a period of time that
KKR was only going to bid for automobile companies, while Blackstone
was only going to bid for steel companies. Alternatively, the seven pri-
vate equity firms could simply establish a pattern of conduct under
which they alternated in their bidding for large companies.
Such tacit bid rigging will likely have an even greater adverse effect
than explicit bid rigging because tacit arrangements are usually more
durable than express noncompetition agreements. Explicit noncom-
petition agreements are usually not long lasting. 255 Furthermore, if a
cartel does not fall of its own accord, it usually must be sustained by
overt conduct that is easy to detect and to punish. 256 By contrast, oli-
gopolists' tacit. collusion is both more durable and more difficult to dis-
cover than an explicit arrangement. Thus, in change-of-control transac-
tions, shareholders will be harmed more by implicit. agreements among
potential purchasers to refrain from competing against each other. Im-
plicit agreements are likely to extend for a significant period because
they are based on a long pattern of conduct and are not designed only
for a particular change-of-control transaction. 257 In the private equity
market, a firm's decision not to participate in auctions for particular
public companies will be the result not of explicit bargaining, but of
each firm's own decision about the types of transactions in which it is
Tires—Investor Focus Will Turn to the Car Operations, Where Picture Is Blurry, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 2007, at Cl.
255 See Boux, supra note 27, at 183 ("Changing market conditions and the temptation
to 'cheat' frequently result in outbreaks of price competition that either destroy the cartel
or must be repaired by further meetings and agreements.").
256 See id.
257 See Sorkin & Krauss, supra note 252; Sender, Berman & Smith, supra note 25;
Sender., supra note 253; MacFadyen, supra note 10.
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likely to be the preferred bidder. Because each firm will be deciding
which transaction is best for it, the firms will be less likely to cheat on a
tacit arrangement to take turns in bidding in successive company auc-
tions.
Despite the potentially serious effects of tacit collusion in the
market for the purchase of control of American companies, the anti-
trust laws do not currently provide an effective remedy for sharehold-
ers harmed by such conduct. 258
 The federal courts have been reluc-
tant to infer the existence of an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade
from the type of circumstantial evidence that is usually available in
cases involving tacit conspiracies among oligopolists. 269 The courts
have emphasized that oligopolists should not be liable for engaging in
"conscious parallelism": i.e., for independently determining their own
competitive conduct with a full understanding that their rivals are
likely to follow suit. 26° When an oligopolist simply takes its rivals' likely
actions into account, it is merely recognizing its interdependence with
other firms, and not even the most expanded definitions of "agree-
,
ment" have been deemed to encompass such conduct. 261
The lower federal courts have been overly protective of coordi-
nated conduct among oligopolists, placing burdens on plaintiffs that
preclude a finding of conspiracy in cases where the presence of tacit
collusion should have been clear. 262 For its part, the Supreme Court has
258 See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1299 (11th Cir.
2003); infra note 262.
259 John Lopatka has posed the oligopoly dilenuna as follows: "[Si ection 1 could not
be used to punish [oligopolists] simply for pricing interdependently, but • • . they usually
will have done more and could then be attacked under section 1. The devil is in deciding
whether they did enough more." John E. Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Try,
41 ANTITRus•r Bum- 843, 907 (1996).
26° See, e.g., Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1299 ("When they are the product of a rational,
independent calculus by each member of the oligopoly; as opposed to collusion, these
types of synchronous actions have become known as 'conscious parallelism.'" (emphasis
omitted)). 'There are no cases in which mere parallel behavior was found by the courts to
constitute collusion." ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 208
(1985).
261 Judge (now-Justice) Breyer has explained that interdependent pricing by oligopo-
lists, without more, does not violate § 1: "Courts ... have almost uniformly held .. • that
... individual pricing decisions (even when each firm rests its own decision upon its belief
that competitors will do the same) do not constitute an unlawful agreement under Section
1 of the Sherman Act." Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st
Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted).
262 See In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 481-84 (1983), vacated sub nom. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing FTC decision that
found requisite factors in practices that facilitated coordination among manufacturers of
antiknock compounds); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 367 F. Stipp. 91, 101 (S.D.N.I:
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held that a plaintiff in an implicit conspiracy case will not be able to get
to a jury unless it can introduce direct and uncontradicted evidence of
an agreement among the defendants. 263 Such evidence, of course, is
rarely, if ever, available in cases of implicit oligopoly conduct. These
cases have placed oligopoly regulation on its head, making it easier for
plaintiffs to prove the existence of express cartels, which are least harm-
ful to consumers, and erecting the highest hurdles for proving implicit
cartels, the most harmful types of arrangements. 264 As Judge Posner has
explained, the Supreme Court's cases have "produce[d] the paradox
that the more conducive the market's structure is to collusion without
express conununication, the weaker the plaintiff's case."265
The courts and agencies should adopt a new approach that more
effectively deters tacit arrangements that are harmful to shareholders
in change-of-control transactions. The approach should be similar to
the standard I have proposed for analyzing implicit price fixing ar-
rangements among sellers. I have argued that, when an oligopolist en-
gages in conduct that is contrary to its legitimate self interest, it sends a
signal to its rivals that it is safe for them to engage in the same conduct.
The courts should infer an illegal arrangement of tacit price collusion
whenever all of the firms in an oligopolistic market engage in identical
practices contrary to their independent self interest. Oligopolists gain
confidence in their rivals' commitment to a consensus course of action
when their rivals engage in actions that are against their immediate self
interest and make no economic sense other than as an invitation to join
in a collusive arrangement. Indeed, actions by rivals against their own
self interest can communicate their consent to an implicit course of
action just as clearly as a cartel's express commitment to a price fixing
arrangement. When a firm risks an immediate loss of volume, profits,
1973) (finding nothing more than conscious parallelism when pharmaceutical companies
excluded competitors from antibiotics market by maintaining similar prices and using
patent licenses as barrier to entry).
265 Monsanto Co. V. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (holding that, in
order to avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs must present "evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility" that the defendants were acting independently in pursuing the relevant
conduct).
264 See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (finding insufficient proof
of conspiracy when regional telephone companies made parallel decisions not to allow
competitors to access their systems and not to compete in each other's territories); Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1985); Monsanto, 465
U.S. at 768.
265 David L. Meyer, The Seventh Circuit's High Fructose Corn Syrup Decision—Sweet for
Plaintiffs, Sticky for Defendants, ANTrritus•r, Fall 2002, at 67, 71 (quoting RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW 94-95 (2d ed. 2001)).
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or customer goodwill in announcing a particular course of action, it
sends a strong signal to its rivals that it is safe for them to engage in the
same conduct. Such rivals will then be more likely to take the risk of
acting against their own interests and falling in line with the consensus
course of conduct. 266
 Under such circumstances, it is reasonable for the
courts to infer that, through their signaling of such a consensus, the
parties have entered into a tacit price fixing conspiracy in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 267
The courts and agencies should be willing to infer an illegal ar-
rangement of tacit collusion whenever bidders for companies engage
in identical conduct contrary to their independent self-interest. Con-
sider the hypothetical example above in which KKR and Blackstone
implicitly signal their intention to allow KKR to be the whining bidder
for General Motors. Allowing KKR to purchase General Motors without
any competition would be contrary to Blackstone's legitimate inde-
pendent interest. Declining to bid on a company that meets its invest-
ment criteria would conflict with Blackstone's interest in maximizing its
return on capital. Max King, a strategist at Investec Asset Management,
has stated that "private equity investors have to go and find the deals
rather than just wait for the deals to come to them." 268
 Private equity
firms such as Blackstone have an enormous amount of capital that they
must put to work quickly and profitably in order to convince potential
investors that they will continue to be successful in acquiring and sell-
ing companies at a profit. Paul Bracken, a professor of management at
Yale University, has explained, "If you establish one of these funds, you
can't sit on the money for too long because it sends a signal that you're
not good at spotting opportunities."269
 Because there are "few compa-
nies with noncore businesses to divest and few distressed sellers," 2" it
would be unnatural for Blackstone to avoid bidding for a favorable ac-
quisition candidate. If a private equity firm such as Blackstone was act-
"6 Some lower federal courts have been willing to infer illegal oligopoly pricing con-
spiracies from circumstantial evidence that defendants acted in a manner contrary to their
independent self interest. For example, in Milgram u Lamy's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir.
1951). eight film distributors refused to license first-run films to a drive-in theater. The
refusal appeared suspicious because the theater had offered to pay a premium for such
films. The court concluded, Each distributor has thus acted in apparent contradiction to
its own self-interest. This strengthens considerably the inference of conspiracy, for the
conduct of the distributors is „ inconsistent with decisions independently arrived at." Id.
267 See Piraino, strpm note 11, at 9, 37-39.
268
269 Id.
v° Conrad de Aenlle, Some Experts at Timing Go For Cash, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2007, at C6
(quoting Max King, strategist at Investec Asset Management).
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ing in its legitimate independent interest, it would not take a pass on a
potentially profitable investment such as General Motors.
It would thus be reasonable for a court to conclude that a private
equity firm such as Blackstone would only be willing to forego a po-
tentially profitable investment in General Motors because it was ex-
pecting some implicit assurance from its rivals that, in return, they
would refrain from bidding on certain future transactions in which
Blackstone was interested. In declining to bid for a company that it
had the capability to purchase, Blackstone would be sending a signal
to its rivals in the private equity market that it was willing to acquiesce
in a "you take this one, I will take the next. one" pattern of conduct.
Blackstone's implicit calculation would be that, in future transactions,
it could recover the profits that it lost in the General Motors deal by
acquiring another company at a below-market price when other pri-
vate equity firms declined to bid for that company.
D. Deferring Anticompetitive Consortiums
In many going-private transactions, private equity funds have
formed consortiums in which they combine their resources to submit a
single bid for a compan y. 271 Such consortiums can reduce competition
in change-of-control transactions just as severely as express or implicit
bid-rigging arrangements. Some commentators have opined that the
formation of these consortiums "has the potential to artificially depress
buyout prices and hurt corporate shareholders."272 As the Wall Street
Journal has explained, "While the ostensible goal of forming buyout
clubs has been to spread the risk of larger investments among the
members of the club, some takeover professionals have voiced concern
that clubs may also limit the number of competing bidders and the
value of potential bids."273
In recent years, joint ventures among competitors have become
increasingly popular for firms in a great number of American indus-
tries.274 Unfortunately, however, the federal courts have not been able
271
	
Sorkin, supra note 12.
272 Id. (suiting that "[w]hile no buyout executives will say on the record that the pur-
pose of forming a learn is to keep the asking price from going too high, privately, most will
concede that reducing the final takeover price is sometimes the result").
273 Randall Smith & Kathryn Kr:mhold, GE Sets Private-Equity Limits, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 9,
2007, at A3.
274 See Charles P. Weller, A New Rule of Reason from Justice Brandeis' "Concentric Circles"
and Other Changes in Law, 44 ANTrritus• BuLL. 881, 882 (1999) (swing that such competi-
tor collaborations "are becoming the dominant form of economic integration in the world
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to develop a consistent means of analyzing joint ventures. The courts'
difficulty sterns from the fact that competitors' collaborative arrange-
ments can be structured in a wide variety of ways. Indeed, the term
"joint venture" itself has been used rather loosely to describe collabora-
tions ranging from mere agreements among firms to coordinate their
activities—such as information exchanges or joint advertising—to
complete mergers of the parties' operations in the relevant market. 275
As Robert Pitofsky, a former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, has stated, "A joint venture could involve any business enterprise
in which two or more persons collaborate to achieve some commercial
goal—a definition that includes all of antitrust, except, perhaps, some
single firm attempts to monopolize...."276
 Charles Weller has con-
cluded that "[f] or over 100 years, antitrust joint venture law has been a
morass of confusion and ambiguity." 277
 Ernest Gelhorn and W. Todd
Miller have pointed out that "the legal rules and policies applied to
competitor collaborations are often confused and confusing.... Where
competitor combinations result in mergers, they are assessed under
well-established rule of reason standards.... Where combinations re-
sult in joint ventures, however, the legal framework [for analyzing
joint ventures] is neither consistent nor rational." 278
The courts have applied widely divergent antitrust standards to
collaborative arrangements. 279
 In certain cases, courts have concluded
that such arrangements are nothing more than vehicles to facilitate
price fixing cartels among competitors, and they have found them to
be per se illega1. 28° In other cases, however, courts have found that col-
laborative arrangements have legitimate efficiency objectives, and they
have applied a more lenient "rule of reason" standard, under which a
economy* (quoting PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING IN A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE 152
(1995)).
278 See Robert Pitofskv, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Venturrs, 74 GEO. L.J.
1605. 1605 (1986).
278 Id.
277 Weller, supra note 274, at 881.
278
 Ernest Gellhorn & W. Todd Miller, Competitor Collaboration Guidelines—A Recommen-
dation, 42 ANTITRUST Bum- 851, 853 (1997).
279
 Compare United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (applying per se
rule to territorial restraints implemented by group of grocery stores), and United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967) (applying per se rule to territorial restraints among
manufacturers of bedding), with FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986)
(applying rule of reason to refusal by an association of dentists to supply x-rays of their
members' patients to insurance companies), and Nis. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. V. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1985) (applying rule of reason to deci-
sion by purchasing cooperative to expel one of its members).
280 See, e.g., Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 608; Sealy, 388 U.S. at 355.
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plaintiff cannot prevail until it has demonstrated that the anticompeti-
tive effects of the venture will likely outweigh its efficiencies in the rele-
vant market. 28' In most cases, plaintiffs have not been able to meet that
burden of proof, and fact-finders have allowed the arrangements to
proceed.282
The lack of clear authority on the applicable legal standards for
collaborative arrangements will make it difficult for shareholders to
prove whether potential purchasers have violated the Sherman Act by
forming consortiums in change-of-control transactions. If the courts
concentrate on the consortiums' potential to limit competition in
company auctions, they may find them illegal as naked cartels;285 if the
courts conclude that consortiums have a legitimate efficiency objective,
they may uphold them as joint ventures. 284 When a court finds that a
consortium constitutes a legitimate joint venture, it will be difficult, if
not impossible, for a shareholder to prove under the rule of reason that
the arrangement unreasonably restrained competition in the relevant
market. In a rule of reason case, it will be insufficient for a shareholder
to demonstrate that it suffered individual economic harm as a result of
decreased competition for the purchase of a particular company. 285 In
addition, the shareholder will have to prove that competition in the
market as a whole was adversely affected by the defendants' conduct. 288
If a court defines the relevant market as the nationwide market for the
sale of public securities, the shareholder of a single public company will
be unable to meet that standard. 287
In a series of articles, I have proposed an effective way for the
courts to distinguish between illegal cartels and permissible joint ven-
tures. 288 The distinction should depend upon whether the collabora-
See, e.g., Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459; Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at
295-96,
282 See Piraino, supm note 32, at 1146-51.
285 See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 608; Sealy, 388 U.S. at 355.
28' See, e.g., Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459; Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at
295-96.
285 See Piraino, supm note 32, at 1146-51.
28° See id. at 1148-49.
"7 In his concurring opinion in Credit Suisse Justice Stevens stated that the underwrit-
ing syndicates should not be liable under the Sherman Act because they lacked the power
to restrain trade "among the Vast multitude of other securities traded in a free market."
127 S. Ct. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
288 See generally Piraino, supra note 32; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Analy-
sis of Telecommunications Joint Ventures, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 639; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The
Antitrust Analysis of Network joint Ventums, 47 1-1AsTiNcs L.J. 5 (1995); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,
Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint l'entures, 35 Wm. &
MARY L. Rev. 871 (1994) [hereinafter Piraino, Reconciling); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond
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tire arrangement at issue involves any integration of the parties' re-
sources. In a cartel, competitors agree to coordinate their competitive
activities without integrating their resources in any manner. 299 Be-
cause the parties have not pooled their resources or contributed any
assets to the arrangement, a cartel has neither the objective nor the
possibility of generating any procompetitive efficiencies. 29° For exam-
ple, the only effect of a naked agreement among competitors to fix
prices, unaccompanied by any combination of the parties' marketing
organizations, will be to raise prices, to the detriment of consumers. 291
Such an arrangement should be deemed illegal on its face.
Joint ventures, on the other hand, involve some integration of the
parties' resources. 292 By virtue of such integration, the joint venture
partners can enhance their efficiency in the relevant market. 293 By con-
tributing complementary resources to the venture, the partners give
the venture the ability to achieve efficiencies beyond their individual
capacities. 294 In many cases, the legality of a legitimate joint venture
should be obvious. Joint ventures should be per se legal when they
permit their partners to combine their resources to enter a market
from which they would have been individually foreclosed. Since the
parties could not have participated in the relevant market in the ab-
sence of the joint venture, such arrangements have no adverse com-
petitive effects. 295 The only effect of such ventures is to enhance com-
petition by introducing new competitors to the relevant market,
thereby benefiting consumers. 296
Similarly, the distinction between illegal and legitimate consorti-
ums in change-of-control transactions should depend upon whether
Per Se, Rule of Reason or Mc1gc, Analysis: A New Antitrust Standard for faint Ventures, 76 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1991).
289 See Gregory,]. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST
U. 701, 712 (1998) ("If two competitors formed a venture that did nothing but set their
prices, the arrangement would be nothing more than a price fixing cartel, and it would be
treated as such under the antitrust laws.").
299 Id.
291 See Pimino, supra note 32, at 1166 ("Naked
	 agreements not to compete, unac-
companied by any efficiency-enhancing integration, have no compensating efficiency
benefits and can be summarily prohibited without any consideration of the parties' justifi-
cations or market power.").
292 SCE Pimino, Reconciling, supra note 288, at 876.
293 See id.
294 See id.
295 See id. at 883-84.
296 See id. In his concurring opinion in Credit Suisse, Justice Stevens stated that agree-
ments among underwriters on the terms for marketing IPOs should be deemed per se
legal joint ventures. 127 S. Ct. at 2398 (Stevens,,]., concurring in the judgment).
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the relevant arrangement permits its partners to bid for a company
which they otherwise could not have purchased. The courts and agen-
cies should permit a bidding arrangement whenever it allows smaller
bidders to pool their financial resources and bid for a company that
they could not have afforded to purchase on their own. In such a case,
the consortium will integrate the parties' financial resources to achieve
a legitimate efficiency objective. The only effect of such a consortium is
beneficial: to allow its participants to enter an auction process from
which they otherwise would have been foreclosed.
The courts and agencies should not, however, allow joint-bidding
arrangements among firms that have the ability to bid for a company
on their own. Such arrangements have no legitimate efficiency objec-
tive. They do not add any new bidder to the auction process. Their only
effect is to eliminate competition among the potential purchasers of a
company. hi the absence of the bidding arrangement, each of the par-
ticipants could have entered the auction on its own, driving the price of
the company higher as they competed to submit the highest bid. Bid-
ding consortiums among firms that have the capability to bid for the
relevant company on their own do not involve any efficiency-enhancing
integration of the parties' financial resources and should be treated in
the same manner as any other naked cartel.
E. Advantages of the Proposed Approach
The approach proposed in this Article would improve the bidding
process in change-of-control transactions in several ways. First, because
express agreements to limit bidding would be illegal on their face, stra-
tegic buyers would no longer attempt to negotiate arrangements (such
as the agreement between Macy's and Campeau in the Federated
transaction) to terminate aggressive bidding contests prematurely. Sec-
ondly, the proposed approach would no longer treat implicit bid-
rigging arrangements more leniently than express agreements. As a
result, competing bidders would be deterred from signaling to each
other their intention to avoid bidding under certain circumstances.
Without the ability to send such signals, private equity firms could no
longer establish an implicit pattern of conduct limiting bidding for cer-
tain companies to only one or a very few firms. Finally, the proposed.
approach would enhance competition by clarifying the legality of con-
sortiums in change-of-control transactions. The approach strikes an
appropriate balance between encouraging consortiums that enhance
competition in the bidding process and deterring consortiums that
limit such competition. Consortiums that allow bidders to participate in
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transactions from which they otherwise would have been foreclosed will
be legal on their face; consortiums that do nothing more than elimi-
nate competition among viable bidders will be illegal.
The proposed approach should mitigate most of the problems
caused by management's conflict of interest in going-private transac-
tions. Since more firms would be likely to bid aggressively in particu-
lar transactions, management would be less able to control the bid-
ding process and steer a transaction to the private equity firm that it
favors. All interested firms would have an equal opportunity and in-
centive to bid for a company, and shareholders would be more likely
to receive a full and fair price rather than the artificially low premi-
ums that have been offered in recent transactions by bidders pre-
selected by management. 297
The final three Sections of this Article explain how the proposed
approach is likely to prevent express collusion, tacit collusion, and
anticompetitive consortiums in change-of-control transactions.
V. PREVENTING EXPRESS COLLUSION IN CHANGE-OF-CONTROL
TRANSACTIONS
Express agreements among bidders to limit competition for the
purchase of a company should be illegal on their face. Fact-finders
should dispense with a market power inquiry in such cases because
the market power analysis has been the most complex of all the fac-
tors considered under the rule of reason. 298 Avoiding a market power
analysis will make liability more certain, thus deterring potential pur-
chasers from expressly colluding to limit competition in change-of-
control transactions. There is ample precedent for dispensing with a
market power inquiry into conduct with such obvious anticompetitive
effects as bid rigging; the federal courts have consistently applied the
per se rule to bid -rigging arrangements, finding them illegal on their
face without any consideration of defendants' justifications or market
poweL 299 There is no reason for the courts to apply a more lenient
497 See supra notes 99-123 and accompanying text.
293 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1763 (1994) ("Proof of market power is
'difficult, complex, expensive and time-consuming,' involving a fact-intensive assessment
of the relevant product and geographic market, each of the parties' shares of those mar-
kets, and their competitors' market shares." (quoting Phillip Areeda, The Changing Contours
of the Per Se Rule, 54 ANTrrRuST U. 27, 28 (1985)),
299 See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 242-43
(1948) (applying per se rule to agreement among sugar refiners to pay uniform price to
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approach to express agreements among potential purchasers to limit
competition in change-of-control transactions. As Edward Rock has
concluded, "[S]tich agreements between actual bidders should be per
se illegal because their anticompetitive effects are clear, while their
pro-competitive effects are speculative or nonexistent."00
Shareholders suffer substantial economic loss when active bidders
for public companies expressly agree to short-circuit a bidding process.
Compare the experience of the shareholders of Federated, who were
deprived of the benefits of a full auction by a no-bid agreement, with
that of the shareholders of RJR Nabisco, who received full value for
their shares in a competitive bidding process."' In the sale of Feder-
ated, the bidders agreed to stop competing "when the high bid was
$75,51 per share, and then lowered the bid to $73.50." 302 By contrast, in
the RJR Nabisco sale, the bidders were unable to reach agreement on
stopping the bidding process. 903 The bidders were played off against
each other," and the bidding escalated from $90 per share to $109 per
share. 304 Edward Rock has pointed out that "[t]he bidders' failure to
reach an agreement to halt the bidding made the RJR Nabisco share-
holders more than $4 billion richer. By contrast, the Federated share-
holders lost at least $178 million and probably more by virtue of the
bidding agreement.""5
There are many examples of bid-rigging agreements in recent
public change-of-control transactions that should have been per se We-
ga1. 306 In these cases, companies that had already submitted bids in
public auction subsequently agreed with a rival bidder to drop out of
the process. 3°7 In the battle for J.P. Stevens, West Point-Pepperell and
growers of sugar beets); Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984)
("[B]uyer cartels, the object of which is to force the prices that suppliers charge the mem-
bers of the cartel below the competitive level, are illegal per se."); Live Poultry Dealers
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 4 F.2d 840, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1924) ("We should have sup-
posed that, if one thing were definitely settled, it was that the Sherman Act forbade all
agreements preventing competition in price among a group of buyers, otherwise competi-
tive, if they are numerous enough to affect the market.").
3°° Rock, supra note 218, at 1422.
3° 1 Id. at 1374.
3° 2 Id.
30 Id.
3°4 Id.
505 Rock, supra note 218, at 1374.
3°6 See, e.g., id. at 1402; Bryan Burrough, Lazard Freres Has $1.55 Billion Pool for Equity
Stakes, WALL Sr. J., Aug. 10, 1988, § 1, at 10.
30 We only know about these arrangements because, as agreements between active
bidders for public companies, they had to be disclosed tinder the Williams Act. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n (d)—(f) (2006). It is quite possible that, prior to the beginning
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Odyssey Partners agreed to stop bidding against each other and divide
up the assets of J.P. Stevens."8 In the take-over battles for Fruehauf,
American Standard, and Pabst, the prevailing bidder paid substantial
sums to the competing bidder to drop out of the auction process." 9 In
each of these cases, shareholders lost the ability to sell their company in
a full auction process. The express agreements among active purchas-
ers constituted the actions of a naked cartel with no purpose or effect
other than to limit competition. Courts should be able to preclude
such agreements on their face without having to waste time or re-
sources in considering the parties' market power or purported justifica-
tions for their conduct.
The per se illegality of express bid rigging should have a substan-
tial deterrent effect in change-of-control transactions. Any express
agreements among bidders to terminate the auction process for pub-
lic companies must be disclosed under the federal securities laws. 31 °
Once potential purchasers become aware that these agreements will
be deemed illegal on their face, they will more likely refrain from en-
gaging in such public, and easily prosecuted, transactions.
Private equity firms may argue that agreements to limit bidding
in an auction process were effected pursuant to a joint venture with
legitimate efficiency objectives. Yet the courts should never view an
agreement among incumbent bidders to terminate an ongoing auc-
tion as a legitimate joint venture. Whenever two bidders agree to ter-
minate a bidding process that has already begun, it will be clear that
they had both the capability and the intention to purchase the rele-
vant company on their own. Under such circumstances, the parties
could make no valid efficiency arguments for their agreement to end
the bidding process. The agreement by one of the firms to drop out
of the bidding would constitute nothing more than a naked agree-
ment with a rival not to compete that should be summarily con-
demned by the courts.
of auction processes, firms have secretly agreed not to compete in such auctions. In most
cases, the public would be unaware of such arrangements because they do not have to be
disclosed under the securities laws.
308 Burrough, .supra note 306.
888 Rock, supra note 218, at 1402.
319 See 15	 §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n (d)—(0.
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VI. PREVENTING IMPLICIT BID RIGGING IN CHANGE-OF-CONTROL
TRANSACTIONS
A. A New Approach to Implicit Bid Rigging
Though most express agreements to limit bidding in change-of-
control transactions have occurred among firms already participating in
an auction, implicit agreements are almost always reached before firms
engage in the bidding process at all. Implicit agreements are character-
ized by understandings among potential purchasers, achieved over a
period of years, as to which firms will bid on particular transactions.
Implied agreements to limit competition among potential purchas-
ers in change-of-control transactions should be just as illegal as express
agreements. There is now a consensus among economists that tacit
price fixing agreements are at least as harmful to consumers as explicit
ones. 311 Commentators have concluded that, because "there is no vital
difference between formal cartels and tacit collusive arrangements ...
the tacit colluder should be punished like the express colluder." 312 Tacit
collusion, like express price fixing, should be illegal on its face under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The courts need not inquire into the spe-
cific economic effects of such conduct because it harms consumers
without offering the possibility of any efficiency benefits. 313
In the early twentieth century, U.S. antitrust policy toward ex-
press price fixing arrangements among competitors was relatively
permissive. 3" As a result, overt price fixing cartels regularly occurred
in several industries, including steel, aluminum, sugar, and ship-
ping. 315 Recent U.S. antitrust policy, however, has become 'considera-
bly more antagonistic" to express price fixing arrangements, as the
federal government has more aggressively prosecuted such cartels as
criminal antitrust violations. 316 This increased enforcement has made
it much more likely that competitors in the U.S. will avoid express bid
rigging in favor of tacit arrangements to limit competition in purchas-
]11 .See, e.g., Unix & KASERMAN, supra note 260, at 205-06 ("Section 1 attacks collusion
because it is a joint effort to reap monopoly profits, and tacit collusion has a very similar
impact.").
312 Id.
313 See Piraino, supra note 32, at 1166.
314 See Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, Optimal Collusion with Private Information, 32 RAND
J. Ecohr. 428,428 (2001).
515 Id. at 428 mi.
318 Id. at 428-29.
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ing goods and services. 317
 As Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell have ex-
plained, "[AV] hen the antitrust policy is antagonistic, the organization
of collusive activity may be more secretive and less formal. Firms may
avoid direct meetings altogether. Or they may communicate surrepti-
tiously, in 'smoke-filled rooms.'" 31 8
Private equity firms are much more likely to engage in implicit
than explicit bid rigging. These firms are well aware of the severe anti-
trust penalties against express bid rigging, and they are too sophisti-
cated to engage in express agreements to limit competition before an
auction starts. "It is hard to imagine Henry R. Kravis, co-founder of
Kohlberg Kravis, calling up David M. Rubinstein, co-founder of Car-
lyle, to scheme about how to keep a lid on the bidding for a particular
company."919 In their public statements, the managers of private eq-
uity firms profess nothing less than an intention to compete as aggres-
sively as possible against each other. Stephen Schwartzman has indi-
cated that Blackstone always aims to get what it wants, stating "I want
war—not a series of skirmishes.... I always think about what will kill
off the other bidder." Instead of expressly agreeing not to compete,
private equity firms can send subtle signals to each other as to their
intentions on whether or not to bid for a particular company. As An-
drew Ross Sorkin has explained,
'A more likely scenario is that a private equity titan bails out
of an auction when it gets too heated, figuring that there will
always be another auction for something else. And maybe,
just maybe, in the back of his head, the titan is thinking that
if he does back out of an auction he will score brownie
points from his rival for averting a bidding war. 320
There will rarely be any direct evidence of a conspiracy in such
cases. No witnesses will be available to testify that they were aware of any
meetings, telephone calls, or e-mails in which the private equity firms
directly communicated to each other a plan for allocating winning
bids.321. In nearly every case of tacit bid rigging, the only evidence of
conspiracy will be indirect and ambiguous, yet the price-depressing ef-
317 Sec id. at 429.
318 Id.
313 Sorkin, supra note 24.
32° Id.
331 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 71 (1976)
(pointing out that oligopolists are more likely to collude without any express conummica-
don).
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fects on shareholders will be no different than if the private equity
firms had expressly agreed to allocate winning bids among them-
selves. 322
In an oligopolistic market such as the private equity market, buy-
ers can, over a period of time, establish an implicit pattern of conduct
under which they take turns in bidding for particular companies. By
anticipating their rivals' approach to a particular auction, private eq-
uity firms can avoid bidding wars that increase the purchase prices for
public companies. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that private
equity firms have been successful in limiting bidding for public com-
panies in recent years. 323 The problem in such tacit price fixing cases
has been in distinguishing between permissible parallel conduct and
per se illegal implicit price fixing. 324 Too often the courts have en-
gaged in a fruitless search for "plus factors" that has prevented them
from condemning implicit cartels harmful to consumers. 325 Indeed,
because implicit price fixing arrangements are often more durable
than explicit cartels, the courts' approach has had the perverse effect
of allowing conduct that is most harmful to consumers to escape anti-
trust regulation.326
The courts need to adopt a new approach that recognizes the
pernicious nature of implicit price fixing. When private equity firms
pursue identical conduct that is contrary to each firm's legitimate in-
dependent interest, they can signal to each other their mutual acqui-
escence in a market-allocation scheme. In such cases, a court can rea-
sonably infer an illegal conspiracy among the participating firms.
B. "No-Bid" Patterns Justibing an Inference of Conspiracy
The structure of the private equity market makes it easier for firms
to implement and sustain implicit bid-rigging arrangements. In a per-
322 Sorkin, supra note 12.
523 See Ball, Berman & Lublin, supra note 69.
324 See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954)
(noting that "Id he crucial question" is whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct
"stem [s] from independent decision or from agreement").
525 See, e.g., Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1970-74 (2007) (holding that
claim of anticompetitive conspiracy among regional telephone service providers amounted
to bare assertion of parallel conduct and thus failed to survive 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss);
Williamson Oil Co. v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming
trial court's finding that plaintiffs cigarette wholesalers had failed to demonstrate existence of
plus factors to establish price-fixing conspiracy among cigarette manufacturers); Hall v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F. Stipp. 2d 652, 680-81 (E.D.N.C. 2003).
326 See supra notes 259-265 and accompanying text.
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fectly competitive market, with many competing sellers and easy terms
of entry and exit, it is hard for firms to coordinate their activity without
an express agreement. In an oligopolistic market, however, such as the
private equity market—where there are few firms with the capability to
bid on the largest transactions—firms are able to coordinate their con-
duct implicitly, without any express agreement, simply by observing the
conduct of their rivals. Thus private equity firms can refrain from bid-
ding on a particular transaction, under the implicit understanding that.
they will be given an opportunity by their rivals to bid on a future trans-
action—and at a lower price than would occur in a competitive bidding
situation. The Wall Street journal has characterized private equity as "an
industry that often has shied away from open competition between rival
firms for deals."327
 Indeed, David Bonderrnan, the founder of the Texas
Pacific Group, recently admitted at a merger conference that "Where's
[now] less competition for the biggest [going-private] deals." 528
Achieving a consensus on a particular course of action is facilitated
by the information legitimately available in an oligopoly market such as
the market for going-private transactions. Approximately seven private
equity firms are capable of bidding on the largest going-private transac-
tions, and they are likely to be aware of the same information on pend-
ing transactions. These firms frequently communicate with each other,
through the consortiums in which they participate and in day-to-clay
business interactions. For example, Henry Kravis of KKR and Lloyd
Blankfein, the chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs (which, with a
$20 billion fund, is the third largest private equity firm), "now get. to-
gether every few months."328
 Because of the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws, private equity firms will know in advance
which firms will be bidding for particular public companies. 33° All pri-
vate equity firms are required under the Williams Act to publicly dis-
close their participation in the bidding process for a public company."'
Thus, all the firms interested in a transaction will know who their rivals
are and are not. Under such circumstances, it will be easy for the firms
to establish a pattern of conduct under which certain firms refrain
from bidding on a transaction and let a rival obtain the company at a
327
 Sender & Langley; supra note 20. The WV Street Journal also stated that "Mr.
Schwartzman is willing to play hardball when a rival guns for one of his deals." Id.
328 Sorkin, supra note 24.
329
	 Anderson, Goldman Runs Risks, Reaps Rewards, NA: Tim es, June 10, 2007, § 3,
at 1.
338
 See Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)—(e), 78n (d)—(0 (200(1).
sn
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low price, expecting that the rival will extend them a similar "courtesy"
in future transactions. 332
When private equity firms engage in a pattern of conduct that is
contrary to their legitimate economic interest, they can send strong
signals to each other that all the firms can benefit from an industry-
wide agreement to limit bidding in change-of-control transactions.
Consider a hypothetical situation in which, over a period of years,
such firms engage in a bidding pattern under which only one or two
firms submit a bid in each auction for the purchase of a public com-
pany. Different firms participate in each bid, so that, over a period of
time, each firm has the opportunity to purchase companies with a
similar aggregate value. Such a pattern of bidding would be contrary
to each firm's legitimate economic interest. In a competitive market,
it would be in each firm's interest to bid on any company that it had
the ability to purchase and that offered a favorable return, in order to
maximize its investment opportunities. No private equity firm would
refuse to bid on a favorable transaction and forego a potentially prof-
itable investment opportunity unless it had some implicit assurance
from its rivals that, in return, they would assure that firm the oppor-
tunity to bid on favorable terms in a future transaction. When firms
act contrary to their individual interests and refrain from bidding on
companies that they have the capability to purchase, they signal to
their rivals that they share a common purpose to limit the price paid
for public companies. Such conduct reinforces firms' confidence that,
if they avoid a particular bidding situation, they will profit in the fu-
ture by being able to purchase another company at a lower price, as
their rivals in turn refrain from bidding in that transaction.
The courts and agencies can determine whether private equity
firms have engaged in a course of implicit collusion by examining the
pattern of their conduct over a series of transactions. With a finite
amount of funds, private equity firms cannot afford to bid on every
transaction, and they know that if they wait their turn, they are likely to
receive a more favorable price in future deals. As Andrew Ross Sorkin
has explained, "Unlike deals when two rival companies with strategic
interests compete—say, Google and Yahoo jockeying for YouTube-
private equity is not a zero-sum game. There's always another company
to aim for."333 Thus, firms will have the incentive to pass up a particular
transaction if they have some assurance that more favorable deals will
3" See id.
398 Sorkin, supra note 24.
2008]	 The Antitrust Implications of "Going Private' 	 1023
be available to them in the future. Private equity firms can receive such
assurance if each firm is successful in winning a similar number of bids,
for companies over an extended period of time. The courts and agen-
cies should be able to infer implicit collusion from a pattern of conduct
under which firms decline to bid, or drop out of the bidding, for a par-
ticular company and then become the winning bidders in subsequent
transactions. Such an implicit sharing of future deals will give private
equity firms the assurance they need to refrain from bidding aggres-
sively in particular transactions.
The federal courts have been willing to infer illegal Section 1 con-
spiracies from similar patterns of conduct in other markets. In 1999, in
Re/Max International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit inferred illegal collusion under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act when two real estate agents gave each other an implicit
assurance that it was safe to implement a commission arrangement that
was contrary to their "independent economic interest." 334
 Instead of
splitting commissions between buying and selling agents on the cus-
tomary fifty-fifty basis, the defendants adopted a policy providing for a
split of seventy-thirty, in their favor, when one of the plaintiffs agents
was on the other side of a transaction. 333
 The court pointed out that,
without assurance that other real estate brokers would adhere to the
one-sided arrangement, no broker would want to continue the policy
because it would lose business to other brokers that treated all agents
equally. 336 Continued adherence to the special commission arrange-
ment only made sense if a broker had some assurance that it rivals
would impose the same arrangement on their customers. 337
The proposed approach to inferring implicit bid rigging in
change-of-control transactions is also consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court's approach to oligopoly conduct in its 2007 decision in Bell Atlan-
tic cm,. v. Twombly, in which the Court refused to infer a Section 1 con-
spiracy when a group of regional telephone companies declined to
compete in each other's territories.338 The Court pointed out that, in
doing so, the companies were simply "sitting tight, expecting their
neighbors to do the same thing," and this conduct amounted to noth-
ing more than lawful parallel behavior. 339 When potential purchasers in
3s4 173 F.3d 995, 1009 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted).
9" Id. at 1003.
ass at 1010.
337 Id. at 1009.
339 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1971 (2007).
"9 Id. at 1972.
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a change-of-control transaction take turns in bidding for particular
companies, however, they are not engaging in independent parallel
conduct. A particular private equity fu-m will only refrain from bidding
on a transaction that it is capable of funding if it has some implicit as-
surance that the successful bidder for that transaction would then step
aside in a future transaction. Once a pattern of "you take this one, I will
take the next one" becomes established, the conduct of the participat-
ing private equity firms will no longer be independent, but interde-
pendent. In such a case, the private equity firms will not be merely "sit-
ting tight" and independently refusing to compete, as the regional
telephone companies were in Bell Atlantic; rather, they will be signaling
to each other when it is appropriate for a particular firm to bid on a
transaction. Such signaling, and the pattern of conduct which it estab-
lishes, constitutes a form of conspiracy that should be illegal under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.
C. The Effect of Public Announcements
Private equity firms may make certain public announcements
that send signals to their rivals that it is safe to refrain from bidding
on particular going-private transactions. A firm may, for example, an-
nounce the types of transactions on which it will consider bidding in
the future. It is hard to conceive of a legitimate business reason for
such an announcement. It would be in a private equity firm's interest
to keep its options open and to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
to bid on particular future transactions. When a firm pre-announces
its future bidding intentions, it may be reasonable for a court or
agency to conclude that the only reason for the announcement was to
signal to other private equity firms which transactions they could con-
centrate on without facing competition from the announcing firm. 34°
540 The courts and agencies have inferred price fixing conspiracies from pre-
announcements of future pricing plans that had no apparent purpose other than to facili-
tate implicit collusion among competitors. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in
Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 446 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[IThere was essen-
tially no purpose for publicly announcing [future prices] other than to facilitate either
interdependent or plainly collusive price coordination."); FTC v. Abbott Labs., 853 F.
Supp. 526, 527 (D.D.C. 1994) (describing charges in FTC complaint against three leading
manufacturers of infant formula for disclosing information that reduced uncertainty as to
the consensus price); United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D.D.C.
1993) (consent decree prohibiting airlines from publishing new fares prior to their effec-
tive dates as means of signaling consensus price).
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D. The Effect of "Quid Pro Quo?
In certain cases, the federal courts can infer implicit collusion
from a specific quid pro quo in a going-private transaction. For exam-
ple, in return for agreeing not to bid on a going-private transaction, a
firm may be offered a favorable position in a consortium formed for a
future transaction, or it may ultimately be permitted to join the original
consortium after the transaction is completed. One commentator has
speculated whether "the Justice Department may want to know if [con-
sortiums] sometimes influence a firm to drop out of the bidding proc-
ess on a deal or help keep the ultimate buyout price lower than it oth-
erwise would be."1" Andrew Ross Sorkin has described a 2004
transaction in which KKR outbid a consortium led by the Carlyle Group
for PanAmSat. 342
 Several months after the transaction closed, the Car-
lyle Group received an offer from KKR to buy into the group operating
the company.343
 Sorkin concluded that "[s]ome would say this is simply
good business. Cynics may be tempted to think that unspeakable word
[collusion]. "344
E. Protecting Legitimate Conduct From Liability
The proposed approach will ensure that firms that have legiti-
mate reasons to pass up particular auctions are not liable under anti-
trust laws. When a private equity firm decides not to bid on a transac-
tion for a legitimate reason, it will not be acting contrary to its
independent self-interest and thus, under the proposed approach,
there would be no inference that the firm was engaging in tacit bid
rigging. Many private equity firms, for example, will be precluded
from bidding individually for a large public company because they
lack the resources to finance such transactions on their own. When
such firms consistently decline to bid on larger transactions, there
should be no inference that they are participating in an implicit bid-
rigging arrangement. Indeed, some commentators have speculated
that the limited amount of competition among private equity firms
for the larger going-private transactions may result not from collu-
341
 See DOJ Probes Private Equity Firms, supra note 38.
842 Sorkin, supra note 12.
343 Id.
944 Id.
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sion, but simply from the fact that there are only a small number of
firms capable of bidding for such deals. 345
There may be legitimate reasons even for the largest private equity
firms to refrain from bidding in certain transactions. For example,
most private equity firms will want to avoid transactions in which the
target company has agreed to pay a substantial "break-up" fee to an ear-
lier bidder if the transaction with that bidder is not consummated. Be-
cause such fees are a liability of the target company, they directly in-
crease the premium that any other bidders must pay for the company.
Ken McFadyen has pointed out that, in the bidding war for HCA Hos-
pital Corp., Blackstone would have had no interest in making a bid for
the company because "the breakup fee of ... as much as $500 million
would have meant that any competing party would have had to fund
considerably more value in HCA than the original suitors." 346
VII. PREVENTING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSORTIUMS IN CHANGE-OF-
CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
A. The Anticompetitive Effects of Consortiums
In recent years, private equity firms have become increasingly will-
ing to form consortiums to submit a single bid for public companies in
going-private transactions. 547 Depending upon the circumstances, such
consortiums can either enhance or limit competition for the purchase
of a public company. Under the proposed approach, the courts should
easily be able to distinguish between consortiums that reduce the num-
ber of bidders in the auction process and those that add new bidders to
the process. Courts should uphold any consortiums that allow bidders
to participate in an auction process from which they would have been
individually foreclosed, and they should preclude any consortiums
among bidders that could have participated in the auction process on
their own.
The anticompetitive effects of consortiums can be quite severe in
change-of-control transactions. Indeed, such consortiums can limit
competition for the purchase of a company just as surely as express or
implicit agreements to refrain from bidding. When several potential
"5 See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 24 ("Because there are only a few fn-ms big enough to be
acquirers in large deals—and many strategic buyers are sitting on the sidelines—they are
getting better buys.").
"6 MacFadyen, supra note 10.
847 See Sorkin, supra note 12.
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purchasers join a consortium and agree to submit a single bid for a
public company, the shareholders of that company lose the advantage
of receiving competing bids from each member of the consortium, a
process that likely would have increased the price paid for their com-
pany. Consortiums also discourage other bidders from competing in
an auction because of the perceived advantages of a consortium in the
bidding process. As Edward Rock has explained,
Once two or more bidders enter into a bidding agreement,
they are able to pool their strengths against the remaining
bidder or any other bidder who enters the fray ... Once
[bidders] combine forces, any additional bidders face[] a dis-
couraging prospect.... The prospect of competing against
such an adversary would likely discourage even higher valuing
bidders.... As a result, bidding agreements may dissuade
higher valuing third parties from entering the contest at all 948
A recent survey of going-private transactions by Dealogic revealed
that the prices paid to public shareholders are higher in going-private
transactions that do not involve consortiums among private equity
firms.349 The survey concluded that "buyouts of companies worth $100
million to $1 billion (typically deals that do not involve ... [consorti-
ums]) had an average premium of 27.4 percent; deals over $1 billion
(which usually involved [consortiums]) had an average premium of
only 16.5 percent."35° In a 2006 presentation to investors, David
Bonderman, the founder of TPG, admitted that "[c]onsortia often
limit bidding" for the larger going-private transactions. 3" Despite such
evidence, private equity firms continue to argue that consortiums
among bidders do not reduce the price paid for public companies.352
As one private equity executive has stated, As long as two girls show up
to the dance, there's enough cotnpetition."353
348 Rock, supra note 218, at 1377.
349 Sce Sorkin, supra note 24.
339 Id.
"I Id.
352 Sorkin, supra note 12.
"1 Id.
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B. Per Se Legal Bidding Consortiums
1. Consortiums Among Noncompetitors
Any bidding consortiums among noncompetitors in change-of-
control transactions should be per se legal, because they do not pose
any dangers to competition. The only effects of such consortiums will
be neutral or positive. No antitrust problem, for example, should arise
when a private equity firm teams in a bidding consortium with a banker
or institutional investor. Banks and institutional investors do not par-
ticipate individually in the market for the purchase of public compa-
nies. Thus such firms would not be competitors with a private equity
firm in a change-of-control transaction, and a bidding consortium
among such firms would not reduce competition in the auction for a
coinpany.
2. Consortiums That Eliminate Financial Impediments to Bidding
If a bidding consortium gives its participants the ability to bid
jointly for a commodity that they could not have purchased on their
own, it will have no anticompetitive effects. Herbert Hovenkamp has
pointed out that "joint bidding is not the same thing as bid rigging or
price-fixing."354 Professor Hovenkamp explains a hypothetical involv-
ing bids for a warehouse by two potential purchasers. 555 If "one simply
agreed to stand down, letting the other win the bid, the two would be
involved in criminal bid rigging." 56 The two bidders would, however,
be promoting competition if they formed a joint-bidding arrange-
ment that allowed them to purchase a warehouse that they did not
have the ability to purchase independently because the warehouse was
too costly or too large. Under, such circumstances a joint bid would
allow the parties to "operate the warehouse together or perhaps di-
vide it, and each use half." 57
Similarly, consortiums may allow potential purchasers to bid for
companies that they could not have purchased on their own. "If nei-
ther [partner] had been able to enter the bidding independently, the
formation of the group may introduce a new competitor into the
355 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 281 CORP. 1. 607, 619
(2003).
935
356 Id.
957 Id.
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market for corporate control	 . "358 Such arrangements should he
upheld on their face because their only effect is to increase competi-
tion in the bidding process. Firms may only be able to participate in a
bidding process through a consortium because they lack the resources
to bid for a company individually. Andrew Ross Sorkin has explained
that "private equity consortiums are being driven in large part by the
desire of firms to bag bigger game than they could manage on their
own."359 Brent Shearer has pointed out the need for a regulatory ap-
proach that encourages the formation of consortiums for the largest
going-private transactions: "If fear of regulators poking around their
deals chills future ... (consortiums], it also would have the effect of
placing companies with market caps of $10 billion or more out of the
reach of buyers for the time being. "360
Thus, courts should uphold bidding consortiums that allow
small- or medium-sized firms to pool their resources so that they can
afford to bid on the purchase of a company with a large market capi-
talization. Morgan Stanley, for example, entered the private equity
market in 2007 with a relatively small buyout fund of approximately
$6 billion .361 The fund is not large enough to allow Morgan Stanley to
bid on the largest going-private transactions. If Morgan Stanley joined
a consortium with other relatively small private equity players to bid
for a company with a market capitalization over $10 billion, the con-
sortium would enhance competition by allowing firms to participate
in a company auction from which they would otherwise have been
foreclosed.
The courts, however, should not allow consortiums simply be-
cause they allow participants who are otherwise capable of purchasing
a company to reduce the financial risk of investing in that company.
Edward Rock has asserted that joint-bidding arrangements may allow
firms to "diversify their investments in an optimal fashion; this in turn
may make each more willing to participate in bids for control." 362
Such arguments are easy to assert but difficult to confirm. Indeed, it
would be extremely difficult for a fact-finder to confirm whether a
private equity firm entered a consortium to mitigate its financial risk
538 Rock, supra note 218, at 1413.
159 Sorkin, supra note 12.
36° Brent Shearer, Antitrust Inquiry Probes Club Deals, DEAL MASER'S JOURNAL., Dec. 1,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 207622278.
361 See Anna Raghavan, At Morgan Stanley,. A Game of Catch•Up, WALL Sr. J., May 29,
2007, at Al,
362 Rock, supra note 218, at 1405.
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and diversify its investments or simply to help ensure that it paid a
lower price for the target company as a result of reduced competition
in the auction process.
3. Consortiums That Divide A Target Company's Unrelated Businesses
Firms may also form legitimate bidding arrangements when they
would not have been interested, for strategic reasons, in purchasing
all the businesses in which a particular company is engaged. Many
buyers will not. be willing to purchase an entire company if they have
to divest one or more of its businesses after the closing. Consider, for
example, an auction for the sale of a conglomerate such as United
Technologies, which operates several unrelated businesses, including
aerospace, air conditioning, and elevators. 363 Few buyers may be in-
terested in purchasing all of the business lines in which United Tech-
nologies is engaged. In such a case, companies involved in aerospace,
air conditioning, and building construction businesses legitimately
could enter into an arrangement to bid jointly for United Technolo-
gies and then divide the company's businesses among themselves after
the closing of the transaction. Such a bidding arrangement would
constitute an efficiency-enhancing integration of the parties' interests
in complementary portions of the business. The arrangement would
allow each of the parties to participate in an auction process for a
company that they otherwise would not have purchased, and the
shareholders of United Technologies would benefit by having an ad-
ditional bidder for their company.
If a firm anticipates antitrust problems because of a market over-
lap with a particular part of a company, it can team with another firm
that is interested in that business, thereby avoiding an antitrust chal-
lenge. Consider a hypothetical consortium formed by General Motors
and Caterpillar to purchase a company that manufactures light trucks
and has developed a new technology for fuel-efficient "hybrid" auto-
mobiles. Assume that General Motors would be foreclosed under the
antitrust laws from purchasing the light truck portion of the business
because of the significant collective market shares of General Motors
and the target company, but that General Motors is interested in ac-
quiring the company's technology for hybrid automobiles. For its part,
Caterpillar is interested in diversifying into the light truck business but
363 Seel Lynn Lunsford, Boss Talk: Transformer in Transition, WALL. ST. J., May 17, 2007,
at Bi (interview with George David, the CEO of United Technologies, in which he states,
"We cool things, heat things, fly things, elevate things, send people to the moon.").
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would not be interested in the new fuel technology. Under such cir-
cumstances, the bidding consortium would allow General Motors to
purchase the new fuel technology for hybrids and Caterpillar to pur-
chase the light truck business, thereby convincing those companies to
participate in an auction they otherwise would have avoided.
Some bidding consortiums ostensibly designed to provide for a
more efficient division of a company's assets may amount to nothing
more than a per se illegal cartel. There would be no reason for poten-
tial purchasers to form such a consortium if they were already directly
competing with each other. In such a case, it would be no more effi-
cient for the bidders to divide up the target company's assets than for
one bidder to operate all of the assets on its own. Thus "it would be
difficult to ascertain whether the prospect of efficiently dividing the
target's assets, and not of capping the amount they must pay for them,
was the parties' predominant motivation for agreeing not to bid corn-
petitively."3" Consider a consortium formed by Macy's and Nord-
strom's to bid for the purchase of Target Brands, Inc. ("Target"). As-
sume that, in an antitrust suit by the shareholders of Target, Macy's
and Nordstrom argued that they formed the consortium in order to
allow for a more efficient division of the assets of Target rather than
to reduce the price paid for Target. A court should easily be able to
appreciate the weakness of such an argument. There is no reason why
either Macy's or Nordstrom could not operate Target just as effec-
tively as a whole. Both companies have extensive experience in the
department store business and would be equally effective as owners of
Target. It would therefore be reasonable for a fact-finder to conclude
that the real purpose of the consortium was to reduce the price that
Macy's and Nordstrom would each have to pay for the assets of Target,
4. Consortiums That Combine Complementary Competencies
A joint-bidding arrangement may allow two strategic buyers to
combine their complementary skills in a way that permits them to
manage an acquired company more effectively. 365 Assume that Wal-
Mart and John Deere form a consortium to purchase the Jaguar auto-
mobile brand from the Ford Motor Company. The companies may be
able to demonstrate that, with Wal-Mart's expertise in distribution and
John Deere's expertise in manufacturing, they could operate Jaguar
more effectively as partners than as individual companies. The courts
3" Rock, supra note 218, at 1411.
305 Id. at 1410.
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should not, however, allow consortiums among private equity firms on
grounds that they could allow for the more efficient operation of an
acquired company. Private equity firms usually do not have any special
operational expertise in a particular industry.s 66 Their expertise is
largely in the areas of financing and general management oversight. 367
Private equity firms rely on the management of acquired companies for
the specific operational expertise necessary to run the company. Thus,
it is unlikely that two or more private equity firms would have to team
with each other to improve their capabilities in managing a company.
C. Per Se Illegal Bidding Consortiums
If the firms in a consortium have the ability to bid on their own
in the relevant transaction, the consortium will limit competition in
the bidding process without generating any countervailing efficien-
cies. Such consortiums constitute nothing more than naked cartels
that should be illegal on their face. Indeed, when private equity firms
form a consortium to bid for a company they could have purchased
on their own, the consortium has the same purpose and effect as an
express bid-rigging arrangement. Such a consortium substitutes a sin-
gle bid for the multiple competing offers that otherwise would have
been available to the selling shareholders.
hi 2007, the largest private equity firms had sufficient assets to bid
on their own in most public company atictions. 368 Goldman Sachs,
Blackstone, anti KKR each had funds of approximately $20 billion; 369
TPG's fund reached $15 billion; 370 and Bain Capital's fund was ap-
proximately $10 billion."' The Wall Street Journal pointed out in 2007
that "These large pools . . . [gave the private equity firms] enough heft
to do deals on their own." Firms could leverage these substantial
pools of equity through bank borrowings. John Lynch, chief market
analyst at Evergreen Investments, estimated in 2007 that such borrow-
ing permitted private equity funds to invest at a rate of approximately
366 Rick Newman, Private Equity An Expert Tells How It's Done, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov.
22, 2006, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/061122/22daniello .
htm.
367
 See id.
368 See Sender, Berman & Smith, supra note 25; Sorkin & Krauss, supra note 252.
369 Sorkin & Krauss, supra note 252; see also Sender, supra note 253 (describing Gold-
man Sach's $19 billion fund).
370 Sender, Bel'	 & Smith, supra note 25.
371 Id.
3" Berman, supra note 39.
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four times the value of their equity funds, "which means that there
[was] $600 billion chasing the market."373
In 2007, private equity firms were able to access additional equity
financing by selling a portion of their own funds to the public. Black-
stone, for example, conducted an IPO for a portion of its manage-
ment fund in 2007, and KKR announced that it would finally go pub-
lic in 2008.374
 By going public, these firms gained a source of
permanent capital and no longer "need[ed] to depend on endless
rounds of time-consuming fund raising from ... investors... . "375
 The
firms also gained the ability to offer their stock as well as cash to fi-
nance acquisitions. 376
 The Wall Street Journal estimated in 2007 that,
given their access to broad sources of both equity and debt financing,
the "buying range" of the largest private equity firms was "closing in
on transactions valued at upward of $50 billion each." 377 With such
financial clout, the large private equity firms should not have had to
form consortiums with their rivals to bid even for the largest of Amer-
ica's public companies. As the Wall Street Journal explained in 2007,
KKR's IPO reduced "the need [for the firm] to partner with large
consortiums of private equity firms on large leveraged buyouts." 378
Recent transactions illustrate the importance of preventing bid-
ding consortiums among larger private equity firms. In February,
2007, Blackstone was required to raise its initial offer for Equity Office
Properties by $3 billion in order to beat a competing offer from Vor-
nado Realty Trust. 379
 If Blackstone and \Tornado had formed a bid-
ding consortium, they would have eliminated all competition for the
purchase of Equity Office Properties, and the shareholders of the
company would have lost $3 billion in economic value. There are sev-
eral recent examples of consortiums among private equity firms that
likely reduced the prices paid in going-private transactions. In Febru-
ary, 2007, KKR and TPG teamed up to purchase the TXU Corpora-
373 E.S. Browning, that Could Topple Bulls' "Wall of Worry"?, WALL ST, j„ July 16, 2007, at
Cl.
374 Berman & Sender, supra note 8; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, After Delay, KKR Finds a
Way to Go Public, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
07/28/business/28kkr.htrnl?dbk.
375
 Berman & Sender, supra note 8,
576 Id.
377 Id.
378
 Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender, KKR's IPO May Set Firm on Rugged Path, WALL
ST. J., July 5, 2007, at Cl.
378 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Biggest Buyout Ever Could Have Been Bigger, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2007, § 3, at 8 (referring to the "additional $3 billion over Blackstone's original
takeover proposal").
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don, a Texas utility, for $45 billion, including the assumption of $12
billion in debt. 380 In addition, it was projected that the consortium
would have to raise another $30 billion in debt to finance the transac-
tion, which would have left only $3 billion in equity for the consor-
tium to contribute on its own. 381 The consortium was granted the ex-
clusive right to negotiate with TXU, making "a rival bid more
difficult," if not impossible. 382 Given the size of their own private eq-
uity funds ($20 billion and $15 billion, respectively), 383 both KKR and
TPG could have invested $3 billion on their own for TXU. A consor-
tium formed to purchase another Texas energy company, Kinder
Morgan, in 2006 was no less anticompetitive. The consortium in-
cluded, among others, Goldman and Carlyle, either of which could
have afforded to purchase Kinder Morgan on its own. 384 In 2006,
KKR, Bain Capital and Merrill Lynch teamed up to acquire hospital
operator HCA Hospital Corp. for $21 billion.385 Each of these firms
had the capacity to bid individually for HCA. If they had done so in-
stead of forming a consortium, the price paid to the shareholders of
HCA would likely have been higher.
There is no legitimate reason for firms to enter into joint-bidding
arrangements after they have already begun to participate in the bid-
ding process for a company. At that point, it will be clear that the
firms have the ability to bid individually for the company that is in
play. Any consortium formed among active bidders can only be de-
signed to limit competition for the purchase of a controlling interest
in the company. In the Federated transaction, for example, Campeau
and Macy's had already submitted rival bids for Federated when they
agreed to halt all future bidding in exchange for Campeau's agree-
ment to allow Macy's to purchase two divisions of Federated from
Campeau after the transaction was completed. 388 The agreement be-
tween Macy's and Campeau possessed none of the characteristics of a
legitimate joint venture. The parties did not combine any resources or
attempt to achieve any efficiency objective. Because the parties had
already elected to enter the bidding process on their own, it was clear
that they did not need to form a joint-bidding arrangement in order
385 Smith, Berman & Sender, supra note 87,
351 Sorkin & Krauss, supra note 252.
383 Sender, Berman & Smith, supra note 25.
383 See supra notes 252-253 and accompanying text.
384 See Sorkin & Krauss, supra note 252.
385 Berman et al., supra note 59.
386 See Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1990).
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to compete in the auction for Federated; their only purpose was to
eliminate competition between them for the purchase of Federated.
By virtue of the agreement, the parties were able to ensure that the
company was sold for a lower price than it would have fetched in an
unfettered auction. Such an agreement constituted a naked cartel
that would have been illegal on its face under the proposed approach.
CONCLUSION
Public shareholders likely have suffered billions of dollars in
losses in recent years as a result of collusion among potential pur-
chasers in change-of-control transactions. Neither state corporate laws
nor the federal securities laws provide an effective remedy for the
economic harm resulting from such conduct. The only potential
remedy for shareholders is a Sherman Act case against the firms that
have colluded to hold down the price paid for their shares.
Unfortunately, the federal courts have been unable to devise an
appropriate antitrust approach to collusion in change-of-control
transactions. Indeed, the Second Circuit's decision in Finnegan could
be interpreted to completely exempt collusive conduct in such trans-
actions from antitrust regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court's earlier
antitrust cases, however, as well as its most recent decision in Credit
Suisse, make it clear that there should be no implied revocation of the
antitrust laws in change-of-control transactions. Applying the antitrust
laws to such transactions will not interfere with the SEC's enforce-
ment of the disclosure provisions of the securities laws. Thus there is
no reason to deprive public shareholders of the remedies available
under the antitrust laws.
After Credit Suisse, the federal courts should be free to develop a
new antitrust approach to collusion among purchasers in change-of-
control transactions. This Article proposes an approach that would
effectively protect the shareholders of American companies. Express
agreements among active or potential purchasers to refrain from bid-
ding in company auctions would be illegal on their face. Tacit agree-
ments to limit bidding, which pose an even greater threat to share-
holders, would be no less illegal. In contrast to the current lenient
standards of the federal courts, which allow many cases of tacit collu-
sion to escape liability, the proposed approach would deter private
equity firms from implicit arrangements to limit competition in
change-of-control transactions. The proposed approach also provides
an effective means of distinguishing between illegal and permissible
consortiums among potential bidders for companies. The approach
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will encourage potential bidders who could not otherwise participate
in company auctions to form joint-bidding arrangements. At the same
time, the proposed approach will deter bidders from using consorti-
ums as a means of facilitating agreements to limit the price paid for
companies in change-of-control transactions.
